When it comes to the F-35 Joinst Strike Fighter (JSF) program, Australian Defence Material Minister Mr. Combet, is easily fooled.
During a visit to the Lockheed Martin production facility for the F-35 in Fort Worth, Texas, Mr. Combet stated that, "The visit has reinforced my confidence that the JSF is the right aircraft to meet Australia’s future air combat needs and represents value for money for the Australian taxpayer."
As any professional politician would, he gives himself an out.
Mr Combet said the 2009 Defence White paper confirmed that Australia would acquire around 100 JSF aircraft, but the government would not formally commit to buying until it was confident the JSF program was meeting cost, schedule and capability goals.
The F-35 program has some serious issues with its schedule. In U.S. fiscal year 2009 there were to be over 300 test flights. We have over 30. For fiscal year 2010, starting in a few days, there are to be over 1200 flight tests–plus the makeup work for fy 2009.
There are problems with meeting "milestones". In September 2008, the program published a schedule that was itself an adjustment to make up for a previous schedule with slips. The new schedule showed that several aircraft would have their first flight in 2009. This has not happened. Several of these aircraft have not been rolled out yet. AF-1 should have its (already late) first flight any day now. It was rolled out in December 2008.
The proof of short take-off and landing with the F-35B has stopped showing up on schedules. It has slipped several times and is scheduled for late this year. Will it happen? While not everyone is going to order the STOVL F-35B, everyone is effected by it because it has a huge impact on overall program health.
Mr. Combet conveniently punts to the recent Defence White Paper that was released as a proof of sanity for the F-35 and Australia.This paper itself is hugely flawed on so many levels. Using it as a reference is a credibility destroyer. And Mr. Combet has no choice but to punt to the government which has to make the decsion on committing money to the F-35.
Not mentioned anywhere is the fact that the F-35 is five years late for Australia. Recent news reports state that it may be 2017 before the F-35 gets its act together for an arrival in Australia. Many years ago when the Australian government jumped of the cliff with this high risk project, arrival was expected in 2012.
Maybe we will see some honesty or at least some awareness of the risks that are involved with the F-35 for Australian Defence. Given past performance of Defence procurement as a whole, things are not encouraging.
Combet, like others that have never been around fast jets in any real capacity, has seen the dog an pony show and in the end, is pretty gullible the seller of the aircraft now knows it. Faith-based marketing of expensive and risky weapons systems is a loser play. Since no one has a clue what the F-35 will cost, Mr. Combets comment of value to the Australian taxpayer doesn’t have a shred of proof to back it up.
Jason Simonds, 
Chopper, 
Bushranger 71 and 7 others are discussing. 
Scathsealgaire, and 
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, 
DesScorp, 
Pete 1:45 am on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
This is not what Airpower Australia wants to hear but:
The F-22 may be legally and financially possible for the US but it is irrelevant to Australia’s regional defence needs and completely unaffordable.
It is like some navy extremist saying the RAN needs a super carrier or Virginia Class subs because they are better than Russian products.
With 100 fast jets Australia’s airforce is and will be far superior to any regional threat except Russia, China and India. But we live in the real world and don’t expect to beat off nuclear powers with America’s most expensive conventional weapons.
Peter Coates
ELP 2:34 am on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
And the big question mark—- whatever quanity, quality and price those “100 fast jets” end up being….
geogen 7:33 am on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
I didn’t know that India is considered a ‘threat’ to AUS?
As far as RAAF 100 ‘fast-jet’ goal… easier said on paper, as eric said. Perhaps the ‘cheapest’ real-world alternative to current F-35 expectation would be to ‘Lease’ F-18 ‘E’ block II+ with improved power, Irst, and other spiral modernizations? Perhaps w/ an option to buy at end of Lease, starting around 2024, or… depending on regional geopolitical threat matrix, plan to upgrade accordingly with a more properly relevant jet of the day?
But I’d also have to concur with ‘go slow’ sentiment regarding 6th gen. USAF first needs to require more F-22 — plus actually arm and upgrade the one’s bought.
FB-22 concept seems absolutely justified and indeed could eventually be a platform for say, 5.5 gen modernization, not to mention be navalized for multiplied strategic reach (w/ shared development costs) and even reconsidered as a more economical and actually doable NGB alternative. IMHO.
Heretic 1:50 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
ELP, the answer for RAAF is simple … Gripen NG. It’s the closest thing you’re going to get to a “Bush Jet” for any austere sites the RAAF may have along the coasts of Oz.
Unfortunately, the MoD would need to “get over” its fetishism for the US MIC in order to even contemplate the option … although at a going rate of 2.5 Gripen NGs for the price of 1 F-35A, they might be forced into it by simple budget REALITY.
RSF 2:11 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
Australia needs a decent bridge fighter that can do the job until either the Raptors become available for export, or the F-35 can finally be really flown and properly evaluated.
While the F-18E/F with AESA has great avionics, it is really just not fast enough to compete with the new Russian and Chinese fighters. While I agree that there are not a great deal of threats in the neighborhood right now, the Chinese will certainly have several Carriers/battle groups in the next 10 years and a China with a true blue water navy will change everything. This will cause India to follow suit, which will in turn impact Japan, Korea, etc. The arms race that’s brewing in Asia at this time will cause changes that can’t be accurately predicted.
http://china-pla.blogspot.com/2009/09/new-pictures-of-varyag.html
The proliferation of advanced Russian fighters to nations like Indonesia and Malaysia should also not be ignored and Australia should at least have a credible fighter force of comparable strength.
RSF 2:14 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
Heretic: I agree, the Gripen NG would be a great fit for Australia. I also agree that the politics would prevent this becoming a reality.
Jason Simonds 2:55 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
Eric, there is enough money in the NACC budget for 100x F-35A’s or 100x F/A-18 Super Hornets or 100x F-15E/SG’s if we really wanted. This has been confirmed by multiple Governments now, so arguing about “financial woes” is utterly pointless.
The NACC budget is well within Government spending means. RAAF WILL replace it’s legacy Hornet aircraft within the next 10 years, there IS no doubt about that. What there is doubt over is exactly when, but that a superior capability will be introduced, cannot be doubted.
Whether we get 100 aircraft or 95 or some other number is really irrelevant. What NACC is budgeted for is to provide 4x operational fighter squadrons, an Operational Conversion Unit and development and attrition aircraft.
When you add up what these requirements dictate, you get a figure of “about” 100.
Jason Simonds 3:09 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
Geogen,
India is not a “threat” to Australia. APA in it’s crystal ball gazing attempts has decided that India is a “strategic risk”. This is because they operate the SU-30Mki aircraft.
Where this falls down as an idea though, is that they have conveniently ignored the fact that the nearest Indian airbase is 7500k’s away from Western Australia and more than 11,000k’s away from the major population base (and defence assets) within Australia.
Why they don’t then consider Peru or Chile a strategic threat (less than 12,000k’s away), I’m not entirely sure. Mostly because they don’t have SU-30’s I suppose, even though that COULD change. (Looks around nervously…)
Jason Simonds 3:11 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
Gripen would be great fit?
How exactly? How is it superior to the F/A-18F Super Hornets we are buying, for instance?
Andreas 6:39 pm on October 2, 2009 Permalink |
Same useful weapons load and range (if not better) compared to the high drag Super Hornet, half the weight, cheaper to operate, cheaper to buy, better industrial package for Australia, lower RCS, faster, more agile….
The SH has a good AESA radar, how good the Gripen AESA will be we will know in a couple of years, but it will have 200 degrees coverage. Also, the SH has two engines, but if that is a requirement I guess the F-35 is impossible as well…
Jason Simonds 2:14 pm on October 3, 2009 Permalink
The Gripen cannot match the Super Hornet’s range except by carrying large external tanks.
When it carries those tanks, just like every other fighter, parasitic drag effects it’s performance, agility and range.
Oh, and it effects the Gripen’s load carrying capacity too. When carrying large external fuel loads, the Gripen C/D can carry BVR air to air missiles or 1000lbs + air to ground munitions on it’s outer hardpoints but not both on the same wing/fuselage pylon.
The Gripen has not demonstrated “goofy” load-carrying capability, though I’m sure if you asked SAAB they would assure you it can…
The Super can…
The Super has a relatively large, very advanced AESA. SAAB are still working on it.
Super has a FOTD. Gripen does not.
The list goes on, but the Super is a very flexible fighter with an outstanding load carrying capability, fantastic sensor and weapons capabilities and excellent “reach back” through the USN.
Gripen is a small fighter with limited loadout options, admittedly addressed somewhat with the additional fuselage hardpoints on the NG, but it ain’t available at the moment, is it? And limited overall air to surface munitions capability remains inherent within Gripen, unless WE want to pay for it…
Sure we could have integrated more, but that all takes time and money. Time is not a point in Gripen’s favour either, judging by the absolute snails pace of the South African Gripen acquisition…
What was that timeframe exactly? Ordered in 1998, first delivery in 2008. IOC? Who knows when, but there is absolutely no doubt that it will be later than RAAF will achieve on the Super Hornet…
DesScorp 4:26 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
People should stop indulging in the delusion of “Japan wants the F-22, and is rich enough to buy them”.
No, they aren’t. As precarious as the US financial situation is right now, Japan’s is actually worse. Our debt is 60% of our GDP. In Japan, the debt is 200% of their GDP. They’ve been living off of borrowed money too, and they’ve been in an economic funk for close to two decades now. The new government ran on a platform of actually facing up to their debt and curbing expenditures. The myth of the Japanese Sugar Daddy is dead. If anything, Japan will probably be paring back their military budget soon.
Eric Palmer 8:54 pm on October 1, 2009 Permalink |
My dear Jason, What Australia can and can not afford for Defence is still a very open question. Buying 4 squadrons of Super Hornets, no matter what I think of ANY aircraft, is a heck of a lot easier than the big question marks surrounding the F-35. Question marks that our friends in the NACC would rather not put forward because they can only visualize the F-35 arriving with little critical thinking. This is unfortunately just like U.S. DOD program managers that go-native instead of representing the taxpayer.
The massive amounts of uninformed comments comming out of government on this topic is pretty astounding. When the NACC etc. has a pretty good F-35 with tested go-to-war systems in it along with a reasonable price, THEN we will know something. No history of any complex weapons program supports the overly optimistic blathering of the F-35 cheerleaders. Until then, our oh-so-helpful friends at Boeing will be there in the wings with a solution. After all the F-35 arrival in Australia is now… 5 years late. And just because we have made silly buying decisions in the past, does not justify any pulling of the trigger on this most expensive of decsions. Also, the target set for 20B in savings in the next 10 years starting at some future date, is just a really bad idea. It is really going to screw things up even more. I see no common sense any time soon.
Jason Simonds 2:25 pm on October 3, 2009 Permalink |
The first 2x F-35A airframes are projected as arriving at Williamtown for 2 OCU in 2013. Do you have proof that F-35A will not arrive until 2018, with this “5 year delay” of yours? Or are you “reaching”???
Agreed, the $20b in “savings” is a bad idea, though I have absolutely NO doubt that efficiencies can and should be found within the ADO…
geogen 8:29 am on October 2, 2009 Permalink |
Jason,
Good point IMO about India not being included in the ‘risk’ department. Even regardless of geographical distance by any near-term ICBM reach, there has been no rhetoric or indication of potential geopolitical, economic or ideological challenge made to AUS. I write it off as being accidentally slipped into the matrix.
As for having enough AUS cash to procure 4x operational squadrons + extra unit a/c per NACC requirement, I guess it would be only relevant as to whether F-35 could be afforded to fit that numeric requirement, hence that arguably legit debate point, IMO.
Re: Gripen NG – being a true SAAB fan and wishing them success on the NG development… it would have to perform various superior envelopes just like any contender. So I would support such a hypothetical future fly-off as only rational, if for some reason the F-35 program cannot deliver.
Bjørnar Bolsøy 9:29 am on October 2, 2009 Permalink |
Heretic,
“2.5 Gripens for the price of 1 F-35″? One is left to wonder how you reached such a conclusion. It is not supported by the only reliable sources on the issue as we speak: the Norway and Dutch bids. Not only was the Gripen’s procurement cost higher, but also its overall LCC cost.
B. Bolsøy
Oslo
Andreas 6:41 pm on October 2, 2009 Permalink |
The dutch MoD has realized (but tried to keep it a secret) that they can only afford to buy 52 F-35s and not 85 within their budget. The Gripen NG offer from SAAB is about 1 €bn below that budget….
Jason Simonds 1:56 pm on October 3, 2009 Permalink |
Geogen and Eric, even if the F-35A comes in at the same price as the Super Hornet, weapons, sensors, fuel, infrastructure, maintenance activities included, the NACC budget ($16 billion) as it stands could afford 72x F-35A aircraft. Enough for 3x operational squadrons, OCU and ARDU/AOSG development aircraft and attrition airframes, just as the legacy Hornets provide right now.
However, the NACC budget is different to the BACC budget. The BACC budget was a one off event during a time of massive Government surplus. Hence, all the “running costs” (fuel, spares parts, personnel wages, food, accomodation, medical expenses etc) for 13 years of operation of an entire Air Force Squadron were included in the BACC budget. Every cost for normal peacetime training activities for 13 years of operations was funded under BACC. Hence why it is such a disproportionately large cost.
For example, ADF budget papers show the F-111 fleet currently costs $150m per year to operate, which works out at $1.95 Billion over a 13 year period, assuming rate of operations are maintained and costs don’t increase or decrease.
The F-111 is more expensive than the Super Hornet to operate, but there are more Super Hornet airframes that will be in-service than F-111 (24x Supers compared to 17x F-111’s) so assuming roughly the same cost per year to operate, you can subtract $.195b from the BACC budget if you wish and you will get an idea of how much the Supers, with all the weapons, sensors and supporting infrastructure actually cost just to buy.
NACC does not have to include 13x years of operation of the F-35A capability. Those “running costs” will be additional to the NACC project acquisition cost. Therefore even if the F-35A costs as much as the Super Hornet, the NACC budget still roughly covers the planned “up to 100″ F-35A aircraft.
Now one can try and argue that the Government is broke if you want, but the people at the dole office get their money every fortnight. Every Government employee gets paid every fortnight. The ADF is flying, driving and sailing around the world at present, so money is coming from SOMEWHERE to pay for these things…
Vince 3:26 pm on October 3, 2009 Permalink |
Saabs offer to Holland cost 9,6 bil euro. Includes 30 year of almost everyhting except ammo. So in USA dollars 14016 mil.
Bout 165 mil per Gripen NG for 30 years.
Heres some nice links to the presentation enjoy.
http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/wp-content/NLGRIPENPRESSBRIEFAug08.pdf
and
http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/wp-content/NLGRIPENOVERVIEWAug08.pdf
Vince
Pete 5:57 am on October 4, 2009 Permalink |
Jason Simonds
You appear to be uninformed about the 3 aircraft carriers and 5 nuclear submarines that India is building.
These carriers alone will put India ahead of China (no carriers) in terms of surface warfare power projection. India also has long had carrier experience while China, the bogey everyone is focussing on, has zip.
India submarines are being designed to carry the K-15 ballistic missiles and then the larger Agni 3 (with a range of around 2,500 km so far).
All this means that your estimate of how far India is from Australia is somewhat simplistic given India’s power projection ship building program is primarily intended for countries bordering the Indian Ocean. India’s nuclear weapons, including nuclear depth charges, would ruin the day of a Collins Captain. Meanwhile an Indian nuclear sub sailing within 2,500 km of Perth or Darwin could flatten them.
India is building a regionally overwelming naval capability and its current friendly relations with Australia may change as our resources become more highly priced and prized. America is our only genuine protection against a hostile India or China.
Pete
http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2009/08/arihant-indias-first-homebuilt-nuclear.html
Jason Simonds 1:56 am on October 5, 2009 Permalink |
Not at all Pete, because we were discussing the strategic threat listed by APA based on the IAF’s air power, not it’s naval capability, nor even it’s ballistic missile capability.
Even APA don’t go so far as to suggest ANY tactical fighter can make any difference to defence options for intercepting ballistic missiles, hence their appreciation of strategic risk from India centres on bomber aircraft, refuellers, SU-30 Flankers and cruise missile defence scenarios their often favoured “North West Shelf” scenarios.
As for India’s carriers, I’ll wait and see before passing opinion, but I would share the insight that India’s defence bureaucracy makes the DMO look positively “prescient” in it’s ability to deliver a project. They’ve limited experience with STOVL carriers and a handful of Sea Harriers, this automatically equates to risk from conventional catapult equipped carriers, that they’ve been telling anyone who’ll listen that they are “just around the corner” for years now? Please…
3 carriers will provide what, 1 operational at most times, with a limited ability to surge 2 for limited duration? A carrier that will be equipped with MiG-29K only, an aircraft not particularly concerning to the RAAF and of limited quantity due to the size of the carriers themselves? ADF has demonstrated ability to deal with a USN CBG under certain scenarios, the IN has a tremendously long way to go before it can boast the capability of a single CBG, so I don’t find this too worrying.
Ballistic missile equipped subs are of course a worry and if you want to call for greater RAN/RAAF ASW capability, I’ll be right behind you, seconding that notion, but we aren’t discussing ASW, we are, as usual, discussing air threats…
geogen 7:07 am on October 4, 2009 Permalink |
It appears ELP is on holiday, but thanks Jason, for the robust but respectful opportunity to debate this issue as you seem to have a good grip on your arguments.
1) Current status: the ‘White Paper’ has stated Govt approval of New Air Combat Capability phase IB, which merely ‘SUPPORTS’ approval of Phase 2A/B (actual acquisition phase ‘yet to be decided’ including 3x operational squadrons JSF, including training unit (not fewer than 72 units).
2) IMO, the often discussed official AU$16b NACC program budget (approx. $12.3b USD), whether still valid or not and regardless of whether it’s priced in 2002 dollars, 2008 dollars, or 2016 dollars, etc, is not as relevant per se; as the self-reliance defense requirements ITSELF which will dictate the number of needed ‘New Air Combat Capability’ operational squadrons (acquisition yet to be decided).
3) But, it will be the ultimate cost of these NACC squadrons once finally priced and the awarded Through-life Support Chain participation, relative to an actual future phase IIA/B acquisition budget, which could decide if JSF is the actual New Air Combat Cability selected to supplement Super Hornet acquisition.
4) Note: FY14 LRIP F-35 lot, is either estimated or quoted by GAO (most accurate JSF estimator thus far) to fall within an avg 6-yr LRIP unit-cost bracket considerably higher in price compared to 24 Super Hornet acquisition unit price. FY15 (block IV) ‘buy year’ is expected to initiate ‘Fixed price’ FRP, but FY16 buy year is expected to be block V upgrade mod, which could incur a higher cost over block IV.
5) Important IOC dates to consider for AD self-reliance decisions vs yet unknown, but still ‘expected’ JSF Industrial support chain cost-benefits:
‘Expected’ [phase IIA/B] operational NACC Squadrons IOC beginning 2017 through 2019. (unclear if this is 1 full squadron achieving IOC is successive years). Probably how Eric is suggesting his stated 2018 IOC date, not sure. (note also: 2018 would correspond with initial hypothetical RNoAF F-35 IOC date)
Advanced Air-Air weapons acquired for Super Hornet and NACC reserve and training stocks (presumably AIM-9X and AIM-120D) ‘Expected’ IOC date beginning 2017-2019.
Advanced Air-Surface and New Anti-Maritime weapons acquired for Super Hornet and NACC’s reserve and training stocks, ‘expected’ IOC date beginning *2018-2020.*
—————–
When exactly is F-111 capability being retired again?? (Critical emphasis intended)
http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/air/AIR6000.html
Jason Simonds 3:16 am on October 5, 2009 Permalink |
F-111 capability will be shut down basically from mid 2010, with the final aircraft removed from service in December 2010.
The reason is because of the change-over to aircraft types. The first 4x RAAF Supers will be delivered to RAAF base Amberley (flown actually by RAAF pilots and ACO’s) in March 2010 with delivery batches of 3 or 4 aircraft occurring roughly every 3 months after that.
RAAF pilots, ACO’s and maintainers within 1 Sqn, 75 Sqn etc are already completing the conversion to type courses to commence introduction of the Super Hornet. RAAF simply does not have the resources to introduce a new type to service whilst maintaining operational capability on the out-going type, which is why F-111 is being “run down”.
The last F-111 pilot and ACO course was run in 2007. No further people are being trained on that type. All new pilots and ACO’s have since trained to go onto the Hornets, with some existing Hornet people sent off to the USA to convert to Supers, as have some F-111 operators because the new Super Hornet Squadron is still going to perform mainly strike roles, but with an added A2A combat capability added. Hence a mix of F-111 and F/A-18A/B pilots, ACO’s and maintainers is seen as the best way to ensure the capability of 1 Sqn.
As for those project timelines you mentioned, they seem about right. AIM-9X for Super Hornet will already be in the RAAF inventory by the end of 2010 to equip the Supers and AIM-120D might as well, because RAAF has an ongoing “rolling” acquisition model for AMRAAM acquisitions. It will depend when the -D is released for international export, but RAAF are very keen to acquire the -D as soon as possible. RAAF is not unaware or missile and capability improvements around the world, contrary to how APA like to portray them…
A new order for AMRAAM’s is being made this year, to provide a warstock suitable for use from the Super Hornet. From what I hear, this will comprise the AIM-120C7 model AMRAAM and there is a possibility that the C-5 model which currently equips the A/B model Hornet will be upgraded to the C-7 standard as well…
The future A2A weapons project will decide which weapons are to equip the JSF and probably the Super in future years. There will be sufficient stocks of weapons that will be integrated at Block 3 (AIM-120C-5/7 and perhaps -D as I’ve mentioned) to provide an IOC, however RAAF will also be looking towards the long term, no doubt with the hope that JDRAAM will then be available….
Hope this is of interest.
Regards
JJS
geogen 7:18 am on October 5, 2009 Permalink
Thanks for the F-111 and Super Hornet status brief. I’m often in the minority on Super discussions, as I support continued E/F/G upgrade capabilities and even continued procurement of gap-filling, modern SH blocks for USN (and possibly USMC).
In fact, if for whatever reason JSF could not deliver a suitable block IV F-35 for RAAF IOC starting in 2017, I could be convinced that follow-on block II+ F/A-18 ‘E’ squadrons is its most rational fall-back alternative (could possibly even allow for ealier F/A-18 A/B retirement).
But if I could ask you a few follow ups re: NACC schedule:
Regarding NACC’s phase 3 (Air-to-Surface reserve and training inventory) scheduled IOC between 2018-2020… would you speculate such systems to include JSOW-ER (assuming it’s successful) as well as JSM? And were you suggesting JDRADM to be included in Phase 5’s A2A ‘reserve and training’ stock w/ IOC in 2017-19? Or maybe an interim AMRAAM D+ type Future munition in the scheduled timeframe?
Regarding NACC-supported F-35 acquisition expecting IOC starting in 2017, in your opinion do you think RAAF’s F/A-18A/B can truly maintain a front-line A2A defense capability another decade – until 2018 or 2019 – when adequate F-35 squadron strength is scheduled to achieve IOC? Or could there be a slight gap of perhaps 2-3 yrs with only 24 Supers on duty, until F-35’s initial squadron is scheduled for IOC in 2017?
Would you anticipate a further incremental avionics and other upgrade program for F/A-18A/B fleet, beyond the centre barrel replacement program, before this work horse’s full retirement? Any probability in your opinion, that a 2nd squadron or even 1/2 squadron of Supers may be required as a gap-filler (funded by partial NACC budget), in case the legacy hornets are starting to retire earlier than 2017?
Thanks in advance for any added thoughts..
geogen 7:36 am on October 4, 2009 Permalink |
Pete,
This hypothetical “India could flip and start deploying nuke-armed Boomers 2,500k off Perth by 2018″ doesn’t relate much to RAAF’s JSF or NG or F-22 NACC acquisition plan, does it?
Hypothetically, Japan could start developing nukes and producing ICBMs and warn AU to back off during 2018’s whaling season?
I agree with Jason here – India is not elemental to a rational threat matrix for which to plan AU’s New Air Combat Capability. Please, Pete. Expanded Trade partners in near-future? Please…
Respects.
Pete 12:47 am on October 5, 2009 Permalink |
Hi geogon
I was mainly responding to Jason’s comment:
“Where this falls down as an idea though, is that they have conveniently ignored the fact that the nearest Indian airbase is 7500k’s away from Western Australia and more than 11,000k’s away from the major population base (and defence assets) within Australia.
Why they don’t then consider Peru or Chile a strategic threat (less than 12,000k’s away), I’m not entirely sure. Mostly because they don’t have SU-30’s I suppose, even though that COULD change. (Looks around nervously…)”
My response in summary is that India will have aircraft carriers and missile carrying nuclear submarines capable of bridging the air-sea gap by sailing towards Australia.
The assumption that potential threats to Australia can be measured by geographical distances from an “airbase” is therefore incorrect.
Note also that threats depend largely on future capabilities rather than restricting thinking to current relations including trade.
Pete
Jason Simonds 3:22 am on October 5, 2009 Permalink |
Hi Pete,
The definition of a threat in real world intelligence circles is a capability + an intent. India has neither at the present time, nor will this change in 5 or more likely 10 years.
Is it trying to develop such a capability? Yes, though not with an eye towards countering Australian capabilities. However there is little doubt that India would have a capability to fire ballistic missiles at Australia within the next 10 or so years.
Once again however, that is a different debate to this one. We are talking about tactical fighter aircraft here and they are only obliquely relevant, if that, to a discussion on ballistic missile and anti-submarine warfare capabilities…
Pete 12:40 pm on October 5, 2009 Permalink |
Thanks Jason
You have a wide ranging knowledge.
I don’t think I can add to the American and within that Lockheed fast jet focus of this blog.
I’ve been F-35 bagging and F-22 extolling for a couple of years – but I don’t think that alters the main Australian game which is industry offsets, marginal seats and ANZUS premium acceptable to the US no matter if the jet precisely suits Australia.
Time to get back to the unique interests of http://gentleseas.blogspot
Regards
Pete
Eric Palmer 1:51 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
Add it up. When the F-35 was decided on for Australia as a concept. 2012 was the magic number. Now (see the news even a few weeks ago) they are looking at 2017. That is 5 years delay. I don’t count test aircraft—if they ever even show up—as they are not IOC material. This also means the existing Super order may end up being for more than a 10-13yr commitment.
Jason Simonds 4:48 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
Hey Eric, hope you enjoyed the South Island. I’m looking forward to a trip there myself, come March 2010…
You seem to be playing a bit of a disingenuous numbers game here Eric. NACC is projected to deliver F-35A FROM 2012. I don’t think you’ll find ANY statement anywhere that says that NACC will deliver F-35A aircraft to the RAAF on January 1, 2012…
However, as I am sure you are aware, initial RAAF F-35A airframes will remain in the USA for quite a while, whilst RAAF pilots and maintainers train on them. RAAF and L-M have confirmed that initial aircraft deliveries to Australia are to commence with the first airframes delivered to RAAF Williamtown in 2013. The jets that are remaining “Stateside” will be delivered much before this and it is entirely possible that it will be in 2012, when these are delivered. Whether that is closer to January or December 2012 remains to be seen, but that is the projected year of delivery.
IOC however is a different kettle of fish and depends on many more things than simply how quickly L-M can build the things and pump them out the factory door…
Drawing a simplistic timeline from the 2012 date to the planned IOC date of 2017 and calling that a “5 year delay” is a mistruth…
Jason Simonds 5:27 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
Hi Geogen,
1. The F/A-18A/B fleet’s remaining hours are measured by what RAAF (and perhaps others) call the FLEI (fatigue life expended index), a measurement of the consumed portion of the certified structural safe life. A FLEI of 1.0 indicates that the aircraft has accumulated fatigue at the outer limit of it’s safe life span. A FLEI beyond 1.0 indicates that an aircraft may have to be withdrawn from service or declared safe by regular inspection.
In mid-2006 the FLEI level for the RAAF Hornet fleet was 0.536 with an annual accruing of 0.02 – 0.03 FLEI at current flying rates (at that time) for 3x Squadrons and an OCU.
The Hornets therefore by 2018 will be close to the 1.0 “magic number”. As they get there, more work will be required to keep them airworthy and a much more detailed safety inspection regime will need to be implemented, which will require increased RAAF effort and cost. This doesn’t mean that they HAVE to be retired at this point, but the inspection regime will need to be significantly enhanced and flying rates will undoubtedly drop.
The CBR of 11x Hornet reduced the overall FLEI a bit and an increased number would have reduced it even more, but a political decision to save some money, but increase potential risk (operational not so much safety wise) was made in 2008 by the Labor Government to forgoe the CBR program.
A sudden increase in flying rates, (such as an operational deployment) would distort this plan and RAAF may need to decrease the size of it’s Hornet fleet in order to increase the available hours it can get from it’s remaining Hornet fleet, under such a scenario or find other options to reduce the effort required from it’s Hornets, such as additional Supers.
In short no, the Hornets do not HAVE to be replaced by 2018 or even 2020, but they will need to be VERY carefully managed by that time, if they aren’t replaced by then and the capability return on the cost incurred will begin to diminish significantly. As long as they are still equipping 3, 75 and 77 Sqn’s they will continue to provide RAAF’s main air combat capability.
As to their capabilities other than airframe fatigue life, I expect that some upgrades will continue. Their EW suites are still being upgraded, with the ALR-67v3 to be installed across the entire fleet, integrated completely with the Hornet weapons system and the Elta external jamming pod to be completely integrated onto the Hornet as well.
New Operational Flight Control software is continuing to provide an excellent capability enhancement with “goofy” load carrying capability now extant throughout the RAAF Hornets (ie: a centreline fuel tank and a fuel tank under only one wing), which has important benefits for overall load carrying flexibility and combat range as well as Litening pod and EW jammer placement.
Their weapons capability will benefit with continued improvement in AMRAAM, ASRAAM, JDAM and JASSM (assuming that project continues) weapon systems and their Litening targetting pods may get an upgrade in a few years (G4 standard is now available) too.
So, yes the Hornets will continue to gain capability improvements pretty much throughout their remaining RAAF service, but the basic configuration upgraded through the HUG will remain as such.
AS to the NACC question, I expect RAAF is seriously looking at JASSM alternatives, whilst continuing to work through the planned JASSM program. USAF may not cancel JASSM which may make the effort moot, but I expect RAAF to forgoe the capability rather than become an orphan operator of the JASSM, so I expect that JSOW-ER and other systems (SLAM-ER etc) are being examined by capability planners.
Not so sure about JSM. It “may” be acquired by RAAF because they require a follow-on anti-ship missile replacement for Harpoon, but they may look at other options. Interestingly, Raytheon revealed just a few days ago that RAAF has already ordered JSOW-C1 with moving land and maritime targetting capability and this will be in-service well before F-35 no matter what happens with that project and given some experience with such a weapon, may not acquire a direct replacement for Harpoon.
Very much a wait and see game…
Cheers.
JJS
geogen 11:29 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
OK, thanks for that very comprehensive assessment and articulated view.
BTW, will RAAF legacy A/B hornets get HMS and 9x too?
I wonder too, when talking future upgrades, if the future CL IRST/tank could be integrated on an A/B legacy mod? I agree though that the basic A/B airframes, as long as can remain cost-effectively airworthy, could/should receive continuous, evolved systems/weapons modernizations. Have to only them them best of luck there..
I’m also going to assess an additional Super squadron as likely being part of the future mix.
Cheers.
Jason Simonds 1:02 pm on October 6, 2009 Permalink
The legacy Hornets got JHMCS under phase 2.2 of the HUG. They also got the AIM-132 ASRAAM, which RAAF chose in preference to the AIM-9X, though as I mentioned on another thread, AIM-132 was chosen at a time when only AIM-120A was available, beside the Sparrow, for long ranged missile shots and the ASRAAM was identified as being “BVR capable” given it’s range capability.
At the time, RAAF felt that the range and “speed off the rail” was more important in it’s WVR missile than a missile capable of tighter turning, though the ASRAAM is of course a 60G rated missile and is no slouch in the turning department itself, with it’s ability demonstrated a short while back with the “shooting behind the aircraft” at greater than 5k’s test conducted and the results reported publicly…
However, AIM-9X was chosen for the Super purely and simply because it was already integrated onto the airframe. If the USN used IRIS-T, then RAAF would have acquired IRIS-T instead of AIM-9X.
The Super is all about retiring risk for the RAAF until F-35 is ready to take over. Whilst circumstances might require Government to order more Supers they are going to have to be pretty dire.
Off hand the scenarios would be (IMHO):
1. Australia gets involved in some sort of conflict, requiring the use of it’s Hornet fleet at significantly higher sortie rates than ACG manages in it’s peace-time operations, or incurs significant attrition because of this operation, or:
2. Australia suffers a significant unforseen issue with the Hornet A/B aircraft, that forces us to retire a significant percentage, or all of the capability, before the F-35 could take over, or:
3. The entire F-35 program collapses or is delayed so significantly that we could not get ANY F-35A aircraft before 2020.
Given the Chief of RAAF’s (AM Mark Binskin) reaction at the Super Hornet roll-out to the question of more Supers (a very FIRM no, followed by an attempt to appease Boeing head honchos with a bad joke) I cannot envisage any other circumstance where more Supers would be ordered for RAAF.
Whilst the possibility can’t be excluded entirely, it is VERY unlikely.
Cheers.
JJS
Eric Palmer 5:35 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
Mistruth… ah yes… that vehicle that hovers around Defence.
Jason Simonds 11:11 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
Indeed, but you seem to be confused by the difference between acceptance of an aircraft and an initial operating capability for a squadron. There is “some” difference between the two…
IF Government commits later this year to the F-35A, then I see no reason why LRIP airframes wouldn’t be delivered to RAAF in 2012 or early 2013. The configuration of these aircraft (Block 2, 2.5, 3 or whatever) might be in doubt, but delivery of airframes shouldn’t be.
I have not seen any evidence that RAAF’s planned initial airframes are going to be delayed. If anything, IOC might be, because that will be affected by software issues and lack of flight testing more than simply getting an aircraft a pilot can commence training on, but RAAF if they are authorised to go ahead and place orders for them, (2nd pass approval by Government) should have their own F-35A’s in 2013.
Eric Palmer 5:46 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
I seriously hope Defence gets out of the JASSM. JSOW and SLAM-ER would provide great capability, especially when you look at the software roadmap for the Block II Super Hornet. I trust JASSM about as far as I can throw it.
As for HUG, Defence was a bit confused about airframe life on the legacy Hornets back in 2006. They wanted to do a lot more but didn’t really announce that they needed much less barrel efforts after seeing Canada go through their plan which the RAAF will do. Be careful with what is left in flying hours and in some cases, this may lead to flight restrictions on an airframe by airframe basis.
Goofy configs indeed. U.S. Navy does this with both legacy and Super Hornets. This being that the heritage of the Hornet family goes back to a time when then very complex E/O pods could not be put on every aircraft…. we are talking back when the aircraft was designed! That is that the E/O pod was an after-thought. Yeah there was Nite-Hawk etc later on for this family of aircraft but it wasn’t all that great. Fast-Forward to today where if one is carrying a Litening or in the case of the Super an ATFLIR one may want to leave the left drop tank at home as it blocks the view of the pod at times. That is where you see the odd asymmetrical configs.
Jason Simonds 11:44 am on October 6, 2009 Permalink |
I guess we will have to wait and see. It is an interesting scenario though. JASSM has demonstrated 58% success rates in testing prior to the big “fix” drama in 2007/8 and since then has demonstrated a 70% success rate.
USAF however wants a 90% rate before they fully commit to the weapon, despite an existing inventory of 600+ missiles. This requirement however is in direct contravention of Mr Gates (and your own, not incidentally Eric!) call for “dropping of gold plated” requirements.
Mr Gates himself has called for US DoD to accept the “70%” solution for acquisitions in these budget constrained times, so it will be interesting to see what USAF does re: the JASSM.
What is also interesting is that JASSM-ER which is still under development, uses an almost completely different targetting system to the “bread and butter” JASSM and is so far unaffected by the targetting and GPS drop-out issues that have plagued the existing JASSM model… I don’t think we’ve seen the last of the JASSM just yet Eric…
RAAF and DSTO have done a fair bit of work on the Hornets, analysis wise since 2006 and the results of their work in 2008, allowed the Government a convenient excuse to cancel the CBR program, saving more than $400m in the process, but with a significant operational risk attached.
As you say, if flying rates increase (because the Hornets HAVE to be used operationally), or DSTO’s homework proves incorrect OR if some unknown previous issue comes up, then RAAF is going to be left with only one fully capable multi-role squadron…
Any issue which negatively affects the Hornet’s FLEI is going to pressure Government into seeking relief for the Hornet squadrons. Any rapid accumulation of FLEI is going to result in the reduction of available Hornet numbers over the next 10 years and if a deployment DID occur, only then could I see more Supers being obtained.
Bearing in mind the nature of Government directed operational deployments lately (softly, softly, we don’t want to do anything meaningful, except at a political level) the Supers should provide a reasonable capability for anything short of a serious shooting war, the reason being nothing to do with the Super’s performance or capability, but rather how much of the “slack” a single squadron of 18x operational aircraft can actually manage.
The goofy config has other benefits too Eric. Most importantly the flexible loadout it allows. With VER’s and the goofy load, significant loads of PGM’s and other weapons can be carried by Hornets now, with range enhancements too, because formerly to carry such a load of munitions the Hornets could carry at best, one centre-line tank. Now they carry 2x tanks, plus 3x large A2G munitions if needed, or larger numbers of smaller munitions (A2A, A2G, an external jammer – whatever).
here is what I am referring to:
http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/exercises/ts09/gallery/20090720h/20090717raaf8164101_0048.jpg
All through enhanced OFC software…