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  • Eric Palmer 11:55 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: CTOL, ,   

    The F-35 and the USAF fy2010 budget 

    Now that the U.S. DoD Fiscal Year 2010 budget is approved, lets look at how much the United States AIr Force (USAF) pays for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

    The F-35 is still in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) so costs of the aircraft will be high. Because of the severe lack of flight testing and delays in getting AF-1, the first production representative conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) in to the air—it rolled out in December of 2008, we don’t know if costs of the aircraft will go down in the traditional sense. There is not enough test flight verification to confirm what is being produced.

    Of more interest is that the USAF has not put any long range planning into the F-35 line-items for this years budget. This is most likely quadriennial defense review (QDR) realted. See this chart of the F-35 in the fy2009 USAF budget which shows estimated costs out to the end of the program. (click charts for easier reading)

    F-35price09GIF

    Below are the F-35 specifics to the USAF fy2010 budget, not counting long lead items for follow-on production. The USAF is the biggest buyer of the F-35 and this is where one should start as any reference on F-35 aircraft price. Again, it is early in the program. This also shows why partner nations didn’t jump on to Operation: Lighting Strike; the effort launched in 2007 to give JSF partner nations a fixed price on early F-35 buys.

    2010budgetUSAF-F35-1a

    2010budgetUSAF-F35-2a

    While the F-35 is meant to be export-friendly, the goal of the program is to provide an affordable aircraft. Given the progress in the program, it will be a very long time before we know any claims of affordability are true. Something to think about when the sellers of the aircraft say it is “affordable” and state some low price with 5 different conditions added to it. For the CTOL, always look back to the USAF for the baseline cost and adjust from that point. That advice comes with some caution.

    Consider the accuracy of the USAF to price predict. Look again at the first chart above for the USAF F-35 fy2009 budget. Look at what USAF predicted that the “Flyaway Unit Cost” and “Wpn Sys Unit Cost” would be for fy2010 and compare it to what the USAF will pay in the fy2010 budget charts. Notice also that the USAF was supposed to get 12 aircraft for fy2010 and only got 10. There will probably be adjustments like this as we go along.

    Hey, but good news. Discussions for the fy2011 budget aren’t that far away.

    .

     
    • Vince 7:21 am on November 1, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      With these prices no country can afford to buy large numbers of them.
      Shame really that a suposed to be cheap fighter program gotten so out of hand.
      Moment has come this program eats too much out of the overall budget and choices wil be made. Either it be cancelation of orders, lower numbers or complete termination of the whole program remains to be seen. But the signs are on the wall.
      I expect the QDR review to deliver the F-35 program a big blow in the USA.
      As for my country Holland it is reconsidering and they are right.

      /Me summons SpudmanWP who gonne explain somehow that customers not paying that much for the F-35.

      Happy sunday all

      Vince

    • geogen 9:20 am on November 1, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Good compilation of sources for brief references, thanks.

      What clearly jumps out upon review, is the 2008 estimate for FY10 Unit Flyaway Cost of $158m. Then enter 2009 estimate for FY10 budget’s Unit Flyaway Cost; $188m. $30m recalculation per unit to the plus side, over one year’s time.

      Another interesting table which must be noted is the total ‘Unit Procurement Cost’ (including initial spares and adv. proc) for FY10 being MORE, and not less, than FY09’s Total Unit Procurement Cost. (The initial spares and support costs – probably due in part to FY10’s block II jet’s cost exceeding FY09’s block 1 cost – contributed to the overall hike per unit, for FY10). This isn’t to imply that Unit Procurement Costs for FY11 or any other proceeding yr will be more than the preceding per unit total UPC price, but it’s worth noting nonetheless.

      —————————–

      To SM-

      In response to your fair comment and clarficiation I will concede to a degree given my misuse of the term ‘URF’ according to how I/you were defining it. I concede I should have used the term UFC or basic Unit flyaway Cost when predicting a ‘Then Year’ avg cost of $150m for the first 250 F-35A. But I was also mistakingly adding, in my mind at the time, the $30m per unit portion from the FY09’s advanced procurement funding to FY10’s URF/UFC budget.

      Such ‘adv proc’ portion of funding should only be added to calculate a fighter’s full Weapon System Cost apparently..

      To reaffirm however, it is a hihgly reasonable assessment to doubt Congressional funding as is, for 24+ block 3 USAF jets in FY11 (priced at the full UPC cost) or to buy 42+ (accelerated) F-35A in FY12. E.g., 40 USAF units’s total Procurement Cost for FY12 buys, could cost almost $8b alone! Does US Congress understand they will be doing this yet? Or should we wait for Oct. 2011 and find out then that Congress is shocked at the bill and saying sorry..

    • RSF 4:28 pm on November 1, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Good reporting as usual from ELP! A few comments from me as follows:

      1. Review the jump in costs associated with engine PGSE in the second table. This for the P&W F135 which is supposed to be saving the program money.
      2. The jump in costs for airframe PGSE for 2010, which discreetly acknowledges the continuing/developing changes needed to support the airframes in testing for the coming year.
      3. The production engineering support costs for the 2010 year are projected to almost triple from year 2008. Enough said!

      Then there is the “Description” at the bottom of table one, much of which should be considered fictional at this point. Some of my favorite parts are:

      1. The F-35 is the next generation of strike fighter which will increase aero performance, stealth signature and counter measures.
      A: The F-35 has a performance envelope inferior to the existing air superiority/air supremacy fighters in air to air combat (F-15/F-22). It’s stealth capabilities are second rate compared to the F-22 and B-2 which are already in service. The statement on countermeasures is pure hype until the NGJ is available for the JSF.

      2. The F-35 has increased range with internal fuel.
      A: This selective statement ignores that the F-35 will have to carry drop tanks to have enough range to execute many of its missions, and which will further degrade its already dubious amount of stealth. This also omits the current range of existing strike fighters currently in service with conformal tanks.

      3. The highly supportable, affordable, state of the art aircraft command and maintains global air superiority.
      A: Using past trends and cost increases as a benchmark, we will be looking at prices per airframe at close to 200 million per copy by the end of 2010. Can that be considered affordable? Looking at the performance envelope of this plane vs. existing air superiority/air supremacy fighters (F-15, F-22, Typhoon, Rafale, SU-30, SU-35, etc), the statement that the F-35 maintains global air superiority is clearly false.

      This program is now on course to be the most expensive to develop fighter in US history. The aggressive 2010 test flight schedule should be interesting to watch considering the difficulties LM has had meeting the 2009 testing requirements. How long can the cost increases go on before the US Congress/Administration start asking serious questions about the viability of the JSF program? All in all, 2010 should be an interesting year.

    • SpudmanWP 1:11 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      “/Me summons SpudmanWP who gonne explain somehow that customers not paying that much for the F-35.”

      Hold on…. The download from the future is almost done…. Ok, the new info is that they will be free ;)

      In all truth, the US is the only customer that will be paying these kinds of numbers. The first significant foreign orders don’t start until 2012/2013.

      The reason I, the US Gov, and LM use the URF cost when speaking about the cost of a fighter is that adding all the non-recurring costs distorts the manufacturing efficiencies that have been achieved. Here are some examples to show this:

      1. Page 41 in the PDF states “Nonrecurring Costs includes funding for Diminishing Manufacturing Sources (DMS) necessary to protect JSF delivery schedule.” So basically they are paying companies to stay I the program until orders get big enough to pay for themselves. When the orders get large enough, this payment goes away.
      2. PGSE stands for Peculiar Ground Support Equipment and has nothing to do with the cost of the plane. The increased cost could easily be due to the fact that these jets are going to Eglin and they will need the extra equipment due to being a training unit.

      Non-Recurring costs are exactly that and have nothing to do with the cost of the fighter. They could be anything and to include them in determining the cost of the airframe is disingenuous.

    • RSF 4:13 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      SWP:

      The fact that the US is the only customer that’s paying that price makes the funding increases for this plane no less insulting, and perhaps more so considering the state of the economy.

      I know what PGSE stands for, and thanks that’s not the meaning I got from those two line items.

      In reference to the non-recurring items, they are still part of the overall price of the project and that makes them part of the total funding allotted for the JSF, so I for one don’t agree with your statement that this should not be included in the total price for the F-35.

    • SpudmanWP 4:51 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      What funding increases are insulting? Since it is only a line on a form, and you have no idea what is onvolved, how can you come to that conclusion?

      If you do not want to accept the definition of PGSE, then what do you think it means?

      I did not say it should not be included in the total price, just the recurring price, which is what the benchmarks are set by.

      The problem I have with some people is that they see the price of the program as a whole (as it is today) and think that is what foriegn clients are going to pay.

      This is a bad assumption on several points.
      1. We are in EARLY LRIP and the costs are enormous.
      2. These costs will go away as the program gets larger, ie you only have to pay for a new runway once.
      3. The JPO and LM have put out many price estimates for the F-35. Those price estimates are based on URF and to see how well they are meeting their goals, we have to look at the URF and only the URF.

    • RSF 5:47 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      SWP:

      If you can’t understand whats troubling about a program that’s now billions of dollars over budget, in a time when the citizens of this country are losing their jobs, homes, etc, then perhaps there is nothing further to discuss here.

      You have continued to speak in double talk and techno babble, picking at individual facts but refusing to acknowledge the truth even when its revealed in the stark numbers in the aforementioned tables.

      Don’t patronize me about the “true meaning” of PGSE like its is your mission to humor and educated me because I don’t understand. I know the definition of the term, as usual we have derived different meanings of what this means in the budget for the F-35.

      Until I see a real, fully functional, flying F-35, meeting test flight schedules, being on budget, and doing what its supposed to do, I will continue to speak out as needed.

    • geogen 8:31 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      “When the orders get large enough, this payment goes away.”

      Not entirely. Firstly, we are assuming Congress will agree to continue funding the total Fighter procurement budget to the point “When orders get large enough”.

      This is perhaps the largest flawed assumption going today. I.e., Congress is not yet looking 3-4 yrs down the road, let alone FY12 when even 40x block III USAF F-35A units could cost $8 billion in total Procurement Cost (not including USN buys). How will USAF afford that with a stabilized budget at best and reduced budget, likely?

      So we will have either high total unit-order Procurement Costs, or higher non-recurring as well as common ancillary costs accompanying the spiral upgrade modernization (giving the Total Flyaway portion of the Procurement Cost).

      “the US is the only customer that will be paying these kinds of numbers”

      This will be an issue at some point with Congress. Non-recurring costs can be ‘passed onto’ US side of the Program costs, true and thus be hidden among actual US procured unit costs. Same applies to overall ‘US and FMS’ Support costs. E.g., other customers ’support costs’ such as ‘Pec Trng Eq’, ‘Prod Eng Supt’ and ‘Other ILS’ can potentially be added into US budget line items. This would potentially be an externalized, additional cost to US procurement costs, if it indeed occurs.

      “Non-Recurring costs are exactly that and have nothing to do with the cost of the fighter”

      … more like has nothing to do with the cost of the airframe/electronics/engines (URF)? Non-recurring costs are of course added to the cost of the fighter Procurement Cost and ‘weapon system’ cost – the latter cost being the total fighter cost recorded in the budget… and one being very relevant to Congress and DoD’s acquisition policy.

      “we have to look at the URF and only the URF.”

      Like planning one’s personal budget around one’s housing expense only. Again, ‘we’ will look at it (URF) only, until Congress eventually looks at the ‘weapon system cost’ line in FY12 or FY13 and says; “we’re sorry, we didn’t know…”

    • Vince 9:48 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      First of all i wanne say to SpudmanWP thx for posting your view. I dont agree wiht it but i like reading opposites views.

      What i see when i look at al these numbers is a program that is running out of money and does some creative bookkeeping to keep it running.
      The program is still in early testing stages and it will be years till it is ready for full production. Prices wont come down for at least 5 years.
      In fact they are going up atm not down.
      Add that to the slow progress the program makes atm. The planes are not mature not by a long shot.
      I seriously doubt Holland gonne order even 52 F-35 cause theres an offer from Saab for 84 mil per Grippen NG. Compare that to the fly away cost from the F-35. Add 84 mil for sustainment for 30 years. And i know what Holland wil do.

      SpudmanWP what do yu think a F35 Fly away cost wil cost like in 2012 . And what wil be the sustainment cost for 30 years. 2012 being the year Holland wanne make a replacement order for its F16’s.
      You think it wil drop from 211 mil (2009) to below 100 mil?

      Vince

    • SpudmanWP 7:16 pm on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      RSF —
      The program, as a whole is not “billions over budget”. What the JET said was that there was a “risk” of it being up to 15 billion over budget. This is not a certainty and even the DoD admits that the JET is meant to be a worst case scenario. And even in the JET case, the cost increases are on the development side, not the procurement side of the budget.

      As far as the program being behind, yes, they are approximately 3-4 months behind schedule for testing. They are not behind on the production side.

      I am sorry that you are unwilling to accept that PGSE means exactly that, but you cannot just make up meanings to terms in a budget.

      Speaking out is ok, just don’t make stuff up.

      Geogen –
      I never said not to look at the weapon system costs, just that in order to gauge the manufacturing deficiencies, you have to look only at the URF. Since all the other, non-recurring items are not itemized, these cannot be used as a gauge. A good example of this is the PGSE line item in the budget. At first glance it looks like they cost is skyrocketing. But logically this is due to Eglin being a training base and needing more equipment than a normal unit.

      Again, the benchmarks set down by the JPO about how much a F-35 will cost over it’s lifetime are stated in URF and that is what I was using.

      Vince –
      I am not sure what you are looking at, but every aspect of the F-35’s production has been getting cheaper every year. The difference between the 2009 and 2010 F-35A was a drop of 19%.

      If you mean that it might take 5 years to get below a certain level, then please state the level and price criteria (ie URF, Flyaway, Weapon System, etc).

      And yes, the planes are not mature. They are now getting ready for Block 1 avionics in BF-4, IIRC.

      As far as the future cost for the F-35A, I think 2011 URF of ~$113 million and a 2012 URF of $96 million. This assumes a conservative reduction of 15% per year in 2009 dollars. This is predicated on the Congress approving the accelerated plan that Gates put forward.

    • SpudmanWP 7:33 pm on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      hehehe…

      “manufacturing deficiencies” = “manufacturing efficiencies”

      Damn spell check ;)

    • geogen 9:10 am on November 4, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      “…in order to gauge the manufacturing efficiencies, you have to look only at the URF”

      Mostly true, but other factors ultimately factor into URF too (such as cost of raw materials, labor costs and USD currency valuation). The point in this whole ‘price’ valuation argument though, is that the ‘URF’ is only one small piece of the constantly fluctuating, Total product ‘delivery’ cost charged to a customer.

      I.E., Manufacturing ‘efficiency’ is simply just ‘one’ aspect to evaluate when justifying or assessing the ability to afford ‘X’ number of aircraft. Thus URF should not be the price pumped to Congress/public. (regardless of a/c type). Period.

  • Eric Palmer 9:46 am on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: ,   

    Iraq: US military contractor burns recyclables, violating contract 

    More folly from Operation: USELESS DIRT II.

    As soldiers exit the dining facility, run by KBR and its subcontractor Najlaa International Catering Services Iraq, they see signs along the emerald walkway urging those who “like to recycle” to follow the path and “Think Green.” At the end of the path, soldiers sort aluminum cans and plastic silverware into separate bins.

    But there’s one problem: The recyclable goods are thrown into a pit with the rest of the trash and burned. While this is likely to disappoint soldiers who “like to recycle,” it also is a breach of the government’s contract with KBR to run the dining facility on FOB Warhorse, according to the US government’s Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

    .

     
    • infocyde 1:41 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Though technically a breach, this is a non issue. Let’s fight and win the war or get out, shall we? Are we there to nation build and defeat AQ and the Taliban, or are we there to make libs happy by recycling? Which should be our priority?

  • Eric Palmer 5:08 am on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , command, Minot AFB,   

    Minot AFB-5th Bomb Wing (B-52) commander fired 

    Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; the graveyard of USAF command careers.

    Just a little over two weeks after the missile wing commander (and others) were fired, the 5th Bomb Wing (B-52) commander has been fired after failing inspections.

    The fired B-52 wing commander replaced a guy before him that was fired after base personnel mistakenly setup a B-52 with six-nuke cruise missiles which ended up flying to Barksale AFB, Louisiana with no authority back in 2007.

    Now hiring equals now firing.

    .

     
    • RSF 4:38 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      I see the silent and powerful strings of a cynical tyrant who happens to occupy the position Sec. Def calling the shots here. How many others will have their long careers snuffed out to support the “legacy” building that this man is engaged in? He is a legend in his own mind….

  • Eric Palmer 3:18 am on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags:   

    F-35 partner nation numbers—clear as mud 

    Any military program will have proposed numbers to be built change.

    For the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), it is approaching the time where it may enter the classic death spiral. That is, because it was over-sold and “front-loaded” to Congress years ago with all kinds of hopeful language, not much of that over-sell matches the reality of today. That reality is of a program that is behind and over-cost. There is the risk that less aircraft will be purchased as problems develop.

    The United States Air Force (USAF) is the biggest proposed buyer of the F-35. They are planned to get 1763 of the airframes. Back in 2006, there were almost 10 years added to the final order date of the F-35; 2028 to 2035-37. The motivation for this was that the USAF is low on money for just about everything. Nothing has changed today. The USAF still has not figured out how to purchase more than 48 F-35s per year once full rate production kicks in on the scheduled 2014 date. Add to this, full-rate production might not happen until 1015 or 2016. All that is happening now is that a lot of “mistake jets” are being procured with little flight test knowledge to back up current production methods. Since no one can state what Congress will authorize 10-15 years from now, let alone 5 years, a plan that states that the USAF will buy X number of aircraft so many years into the future is so much vaporware. USAF has already stated that there may be less than those 1763, but certainly more than 1500. Any number slip means that costs will rise. USAF at this time will be lucky to see F-35s numbering in the hundreds.

    All of this has a huge affect on the F-35 JSF partner nations. If the biggest buyer of the F-35 is having problems, it won’t be easy.

    The chart below shows the JSF partner nations. I consider it very optimistic. Many partner nations already have their own F-35 death spiral in progress. The asterisk shows partner nations that have some kind of overly obvious risk with the program. For example Canada and Denmark are looking at competition and not just the F-35 to replace their ageing fighter aircraft. The JSF plan (PDF) is an estimate of what partner nations will buy. It is not an absolute. Norwegian defence has stated that they will go with the F-35. The problem is that the politicians have to approve the money. This will be difficult with a military that is hurting in other areas. The Netherlands is not a done deal. Even if it does become one, the rising price in the F-35 project means that they will never see anywhere near 85 F-35s. The U.K. is a dying patient. Turkey looks good right now as they have a lot of home industry. Australia? Hard to say at this time what the politicians will fund. If they authorize money to be spent buying F-35s, it will join a long line of other high risk military procurement programs. This is a national tradition.

    Maybe 2010 will be a year that the F-35 program gets turned around and shows real progress. Lets hope so.

    F-35
    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Partner Nation Status
    Country Plan Actual
    Australia 100 100
    Canada * 80 65
    Denmark * 48 30
    Italy 131 131
    Netherlands * 85 85
    Norway * 48 48
    Turkey 100 120
    United
    Kingdom  *
    138 50
    Totals 730 629

    .

     
    • Bellistner 4:18 am on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Australia has put itself in the position of not having many options. When the Boeing PowerPoint slides came across the various Canberra desks, it seems like there was a collective grin break out, and John Howard said “We’ll take a hundred. Anything to subsidise US defense spending for my mate George!”.
      And so, with no oversight, a cancellation of the pre-existing AIR6000 project (which was already looking into future jets), and the announced cessation of the F-111 program, the decision was made.
      When The Coalition was unceremoniously turfed out of office 18 months ago, the Labor government looked into the whole shebang, and came to the conclusion that a not-yet-delivered-and-probably late F-35 that has a combat range allowing it to barely attack Hobart from Melbourne maybe wasn’t such a good idea when compared to the F-111 with nearly four times the combat range, extensive personell experience, and copious spare parts. However, the F-111 decomissioning program was too far along, so that was that. We’re currently leasing F-18E’s to supplement our aging F/A-18A/Bs, which are rapidly wearing out their centrebarrels.
      Apparently, the fact that Australia is surrounded by large bodies of water, necessitating an aircraft with a large combat range didn’t enter the heads of those making decisions (there was even talk of mounting A2A missiles on P3C Orions, fer christs sake, to “ensure there was no capability gap” between F-111 decom and F-35 arrival).

      When the ‘final’ cost of the F-35 is finally revealed, we’d have probably been better off skipping the F-18E’s (which are essentially a new aircraft anyway, so no inventory advantage) and going straight to buying, outright, a fleet of the venerable F-15E Strike Eagles.

      • Jason Simonds 3:18 am on November 1, 2009 Permalink | Reply

        I love well informed commentary. It’s so “relevant”…

        There was NO talk of arming P-3’s with A2A missiles. There was talk of arming them with the follow-on standoff missile, the AGM-158 JASSM which mirrors the practice of the USN with it’s P-3/SLAM-ER combo.

        ADF decided not to go down this path however, due to a poor return on investment given the relatively short remaining life of the P-3 in Australian service (less than 10 years) and retained the P-3/Harpoon missile combo, which will tide us over until P-8A and whichever missile is chosen to replace the Harpoon is brought into service.

        The distance between Melbourne and Hobart is 601 kilometres, as the crow flies. The combat radius of the F-35A is 673nm on a typical strike mission (ie: 673nm each WAY with 5200lbs of internal stores). Perhaps you could do a bit of math, eh?

        According to my math it could take off from Avalon, fly to Hobart strike it’s targets with a minimum of 30 minutes “on station”, conduct a post strike BDA mission and fly back to Avalon to prepare for it’s next mission, without being refuelled in the air and with plenty of margin before it reaches “bingo”.

        Whilst the F-111 could do this too, what’s the point? So could a P-3 Orion or a B-737. If there is a fighter threat based in Hobart, the F-111 is worse than useless because no-one will risk flying the mission in the first place, without fighter escort.

        So all you need to strike Hobart in the face of an actual threat with an F-111 is:

        A). The F-111 capability. This includes the external jamming pod, sidewinder AAM and AGM-142 missile of which the Pig can only carry 2x missiles.

        2). A fighter capability to escort the F-111 and engage the enemy fighters/GBAD systems that will KNOW the F-111 is coming thanks to it’s “barn door” radar cross section and hugely “visible” terrain following radar.

        3). An air to air refueller aircraft to provide the fighters sufficient range to exploit the so-called advantage of the F-111 platform.

        Yah, a very elegant and efficient way of achieving strike capability…

        • Bellistner 4:53 pm on November 1, 2009 Permalink

          There was NO talk of arming P-3’s with A2A missiles. There was talk of arming them with the follow-on standoff missile, the AGM-158 JASSM which mirrors the practice of the USN with it’s P-3/SLAM-ER combo.

          That was supposed to be A2G, not A2A. Sorry.
          The logic of even the USN mounting standoff attack missiles on an Orion fails me. Equiping a slow, turboprop aircraft with the RCS of a battleship with weapons and sending it up against an enemy who will presumably have something like a modern Sukhoi stikes me as a good way to end up with a lot of shot-down Orions. Of course, maybe the USN was thinking of using the Orions as an attack platform in an uncontested airspace.
          Using an Orion to go after shipping is one thing, going after land targets is quite another, in my book.

          The distance between Melbourne and Hobart is 601 kilometres, as the crow flies. The combat radius of the F-35A is 673nm on a typical strike mission (ie: 673nm each WAY with 5200lbs of internal stores). Perhaps you could do a bit of math, eh?

          My comment wasn’t meant to be a hard-and-fast examination, but just a bit of hyperbole to illustrate the fact we’re replacing a strategic (for Australia, tactical for someone like the US) bomber with a short/medium-range ‘jack of all trades’.
          By all means, the F-35 is a good replacement for the F/A-18’s, but not for the F-111, in my book at least. Perhaps the ADF is adopting a ‘let them come to us’ strategy of continental defense, and so extreme combat range isn’t such an issue.
          Any reasonable (imo) appraisal of future threats to Australia would come to the conclusion that only Indonesia, China, India, and the US are credible threats. Indonesia seems to be too fractured to present a ‘full-scale’ threat, the US is an ally, India is preoccupied with China and Pakistan, and China hasn’t been historically expansionist. Thus, one could come to the conclusion that low-intensiy conflicts are the future for Australia, and that the requirement of fighter escorts for an F-111 strike package is perhaps less necessary. All of the above countries vastly out-populate Australia, and if it comes to a full scale fight, we’re probably toast, even if we had a fleet of FB-22’s, F-35A’s, and ’stretched’ F-35’s at our disposal. In fact, I reckon China, India, and Indonesia wouldn’t have to even engage us militarily: just build a bunch of boats and send the civilian population over. It’s not like we’ll sink them.

          In any case, it seems the ‘fighter clique’ in Russell Hill has won the argument over the ‘bomber clique’. Perhaps all the development problems the F-35 has had means it’ll have got all of them out of the way, and will have none during operation. :D One can hope. The F-111 had a troubled development and it turned out to be a great buy. In any case, the decision’s been made, and we all have to live with it. I’d be a lot more comfortable if the Coalition (read: Howard) had actually followed some sort of procedure rather than falling for some slick talk and fancy PowerPoint slides. If the F-35 turns out to be a great buy I’ll be more than happy, but the ADF/Government has made a lot of bad decisions in recent years, and it doesn’t fill me with confidence. :(

    • geogen 6:34 am on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Very hard hitting, but legit article, Eric.

      Regarding the 2007 USAF assessment of a 48/yr max F-35 procurement plan… unfortunately, the long-term price estimates have gone up since then?? That is, in 2007 USAF/DoD planners were calculating an avg price of $80m (TY Unit Recurring Flyaway) CTOL variant or something? Avg price could be 50% greater than this? I mean… if the first 250 F-35A units are priced at an avg of $150m URF (TY).. to get an avg. $80m (TY) for the first 1,250 jets (for example); we’re talking perhaps $60m avg URF (TY) price for jet following LRIP? Or an avg in CY 2007 dollars of about $45-50m per URF??

      I just have to say the AF/DoD estimates will have to be recalculated. My current guess would be a max of 40/yr AF units, for the best FRP buy year.

      Another catastrophic prediction would be: FY12 order reduced from current 42 AF units to 30. This while DoD is currently calculating requirements for an acceleration!

      A plan B is only way to address that! Check mate DoD/JPO, I’m sorry.

      And the only reason I’m repeating such a public comment and will continue to… is to press the issue for US Congress to understand this imminent strategic airpower ‘recalculation’ before it’s too late to determine alternate recapitalization plans are necessary.

      God speed..

    • Andreas 9:45 am on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Forget the number 85 for Holland!

      Jack de Vries has in secret been planning for 52 jets for 3-4 yeras since the dutch MoD has realized that their money wont get them any more aircrafts….

    • RSF 4:26 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Building on what Bellistner stated above, there are alternative US and European fighters that are flying that offer more performance in many areas.

      The F-15SG, Tranche 3 Typhoon, and Rafale all offer AESA, IRST, and superior speed and range over the proposed F-35A which Australia intends to purchase.

      While the F-35’s proposed capabilities certainly look good on paper, it remains to be seen at this point if LM can produce a functional plane that works as well as their numerous PowerPoint presentations indicate.

      The jury will be out until we can see a fully equipped F-35A flying at Red Flag to see what it can really do, and its anyone’s guess when that will happen at the present glacial rate of JSF development.

    • SpudmanWP 10:02 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Just to clarify some pricing issues. The average URF for the first 25 F-35As was $159.5 million and that is with only 10 in the 2010 budget. The 2011 budget is set to have 24 (plus whatever Gates wants to accelerate).

      If you want to run the numbers yourself, the 2010 USAF budget is here(page 40):
      http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090511-090.pdf

      If the 24 F-35A fighters in the 2011 are only 10% cheaper than the 2010 jets (btw, the 2010 jets were 19% cheaper than 2009), then the first 49 F-35s will have an average URF of $140 Million. Whomever came up with the calculation that the first 250 will have an average URF price of $150 million is just plain wrong. That being said, the path to URF $80 is even shorter.

      The sad fact is that many do not do their own research on the true cost of fighter procurement and if they did, they would realize that the F-35 is not a relatively expensive system.

    • myk 2:46 pm on November 1, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      dear eric,

      good findings. and also in dutch case, will cut the halve according to boeder who is dutchman.

    • Jason Simonds 2:42 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Hey, Bellistner,

      The point about the F-111 is that just like the P-3 it too can no longer operate without fighter escort in the face of a Sukhoi threat. Given the cost, that structure no longer provides the “bang for buck” we need.

      Even Air Power Australia recognised this by requiring their AIR-6000 proposal to be a dual F-22/F-111 force. If our primary strike platform can only operate in an entirely sanitised air space, then what use is it in the force structure? It no longer provides the “big stick” that it is meant to, unless most or all threats to it have already been removed…

      It should be apparent that ADF and Government have realised that moving to an all tactical fighter force supported by tankers does indeed seem insufficient to fully cater for long range strike needs and long ranged missile capabilities have now been authorised for ADF acquisition.

      Much to Eric’s chagrin no doubt, AGM-158 JASSM will be in the ADF inventory in years to come, AGM-158 JASSM-ER will be added in years to come (JSOW-ER perhaps too) and a long ranged naval surface and perhaps sub-surface missile capability will be added to the ADF Orbat from the time the Air Warfare Destroyers are introduced into service and beyond for follow-on platforms.

      In my opinion, a greater tanker fleet is what Australia truly needs to enhance it’s strike capability, with a minimum of 2x KC-30A tankers per fighter squadron being the necessary ratio for a credible capability.

      But in the face of funding realities, F-35A, KC-30A, JASSM/JASSM-ER and naval missile strike capability will provide a more than credible strike capability in years to come and one that will be the envy of many nations within our region…

      Just wait to hear the howls of fury that will erupt when ADF announces it’s Tactical Tomahawk Block IV acquisition from our neighbours if you don’t believe that…

      They had a massive spit when JASSM was announced. Just wait until the formal announcement of a sub-launched 2000k ranged cruise missile capability to be introduced is released…

    • Eric Palmer 4:15 am on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Jason brings up some good points.

      Of interest is now that so many years have gone on, that the legacy Hornet is going to be at high risk if the F-35 doesn’t show up in 2017-18. That of course assumes all the bugs work out. That also assumes affordability which is yet to be proven.

      The JASSM looked great on paper. Yet now with the unit cost being up to around 1.14 mil each U.S., as opposed to the original low-ball price, I don’t think you will see Australia buying too many of these silver bullets.

      As for the tanker issue, Australia will never have enough tankers. The ratio of tankers to fighter aircraft depends greatly on the operation. Barcap is way different than deep strike (hello Operation: Eldorado Canyon). A set of JASSMs on a legacy or Super Hornet is draggy on an already short-legged airframe. The 4 degree toe-out of hardpoints on the Super means lots of tanker work. Also fuel offload to the F-35 or F-111 take a lot of gas. Range is not proven on the F-35 yet. (chilled fuel in testing and heat-sink issues have to pan out) So, again, the best that Australia can hope for with its new and very good tankers is enough to surge for Barcap or tanker drags on a deployment.

      While there are all kinds of enemy scenarios, I don’t think Australia will be defenseless. Yet much of the justification on purchase of various kinds of weapons systems needs a lot more work.

      With that, U.S. funding for PACAF exercise deployments should revolve around a package of F-22s, Strike Eagles, tankers and support, doing an annual exercise in Australia. Appearances do matter.

    • Jason Simonds 12:55 pm on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Hey Eric,

      Australia has already ordered 260x AGM-158 JASSM weapons and as I’ve previously discussed makes “rolling” purchases of weapons. How many of those weapons have been delivered to date and how many will incorporate the new fixes will be the main questions to be answered, but JASSM has a big future in RAAF, there is little doubt about that.

      Even at USD$1m (and I’m not convinced the individual price has risen that much) it’s costing the same as Harpoon Block II, which is apparently affordable for ADF…

      As for regular US deployments, USMC, USN and USAF all make multiple trips per year for Ex’s Aces North, Arnhem Thunder etc… Very visible on a strategic level who our friends are…

    • Bellistner 4:34 pm on November 2, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Jason Simonds said:

      Even Air Power Australia recognised this by requiring their AIR-6000 proposal to be a dual F-22/F-111 force. If our primary strike platform can only operate in an entirely sanitised air space, then what use is it in the force structure? It no longer provides the “big stick” that it is meant to, unless most or all threats to it have already been removed…

      I can think of a few missions where the loiter time of the F-111 would come in extremely useful. As a deep strike platform, you’re probably right in that it can’t do that anymore without an escort. In fact, I reckon that probably the only airfract that can do that these days are the B-1B, F-22, and perhaps the Tu-160 (and of course, the B-2). With the decom of the F-111, and the chance of us aquiring F-22’s somewhere around Kelvin, it leaves us in a bit of a pickle.

      Jason Simonds said:

      In my opinion, a greater tanker fleet is what Australia truly needs to enhance it’s strike capability, with a minimum of 2x KC-30A tankers per fighter squadron being the necessary ratio for a credible capability

      Eric Palmer said:

      As for the tanker issue, Australia will never have enough tankers.

      More tankers and more AEWCS!

  • Eric Palmer 10:48 pm on October 30, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: 7A7, air refueling tanker,   

    Cartoon Time—Boeing 7A7 tanker 

    Since we don’t know if Boeing will do a 767 body or 777 body for the next USAF air-refueling tanker, we get cartoons.

    Boeing Hornets made it in to the cartoon. Ditto with F-22s, as Boeing makes a big chunk of that airframe. The F-35? No can do. “Winner take all” and all that.

    As usual, this marketing video is like most weapon system adverts; moronic cliche and unoriginal.

    .

     
    • Andrew McLaughlin 11:04 pm on October 30, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Combat ready? From when…? Note the winglets on the 767.

    • RSF 4:30 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      I don’t know whats worse, Boeing’s video’s or LM’s stupefying JSF PowerPoint presentations!

      Welcome to spin and techno-babble in the 21st century….

    • torrent 6:08 pm on October 31, 2009 Permalink | Reply

      Corporate America is all about hype, hope, and power points. Great strategy… look at where we are now today.

  • Eric Palmer 9:17 pm on October 30, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , failures, Italy, public awareness   

    Welcome to sunny Italy 

    I have come to the conclusion that the average Australian citizen treats the goings-on in the Defence bureaucracy much like Italians view government.

    There is the shrug of the shoulders and a varity of comments that it has always been screwed up and the ability of senior Defence officials to have any sane control over things like Defence procurement and sustainment is a running joke.

    Multi-billion dollar hopes and dreams of aircraft, ships, submarines and any other gold plated PowerPoint proposal to come down the pike is the the catalyst for more bad decisions from our senior Defence officials. This is the ultimate vicious circle.

    The general public knows that most of this will get screwed up. While most wouldn’t know the very basics of all of this expensive military gear, they do know that there is such a wealth of management incompetence at the senior Defence levels that in the end everything evens out. While there are some outrageous fees to the taxpayer for all the faulty procurement and sustainment of weapons systems, it can only get so far because really big dollar efforts usually mean spectacular big dollar failure to deliver on the promise.

    So, let them order subs, ships, aircraft and so-on well over to the tune of $100 billion dollars in total life costs. Those efforts—except on proven in-production projects that only require screw driver work and some warehousing along with turning one’s soveriegnty over to a foreign entity—will usually fail.

    The other part of that public awareness—realistic public discussion on which weapons systems provide a practical defence for Australia, or how much all of this deskilling of Defence management will cost all of us—the quanity of quality discussion by the masses on how to fix all of this, is not present. “Italia”.

    .

     
  • Eric Palmer 9:22 am on October 30, 2009 Permalink | Reply  

    Links of Interest 30 Oct 2009 – Part 2 

    The failings of the U.K. MOD re: the 2006 Nimrod mishap should be required reading for those planning a strategic review of defence. It seems that a recent Pak military offensive has found some hints of 9/11.

    The Serbian military pal up with a visit to the Chicoms. Indonesia, a rising middle power? South Korea lays blame for cyber-attacks on you-know-who. Also re: Korea, those recent NORK short-range missile tests failed. In Russia, a short-ranged ballistic missile self-destructed in a shoot-ex.

    For the USAF, a look at KC-10 air-refueling tanker maintenance. Consider the value of big tankers. And finally, there is money to be made selling AFSO21 training to the USAF.

    .

     
  • Eric Palmer 8:58 am on October 30, 2009 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: skynet   

    Skynet 

    reapinator

    http://xkcd.com/652/

    Via http://xkcd.com/652/

    H/T-David Axe

    .

     
  • Eric Palmer 12:34 am on October 30, 2009 Permalink | Reply  

    USAF F-35 candidate bases announced 

    The process of where to put the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in USAF service continues. Some of these are obvious. I wonder about a few like Jacksonville. We will know more about the finalists in 2010.

    “Eleven bases have been selected as candidate bases and include for training: Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, Idaho; Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; Holloman AFB N.M.; Luke AFB, Ariz.; and Tuscon International Airport Air Guard Station, Ariz. The six bases selected as candidate bases for operations are: Burlington International Airport Guard Station, Vt.; Hill AFB, Utah; Jacksonville International Airport Air Guard Station, Fla.; Mountain Home AFB, Idaho; Shaw AFB, S.C.; and McEntire Air Guard Base, S.C.”

    .

     
  • Eric Palmer 8:38 pm on October 29, 2009 Permalink | Reply  

    Links of Interest 30 Oct 2009 

     
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