For senior Defence bureaucrats it is all about spinning the message over substance. Given that the recent joke of a defence white paper asks more questions than it answers, they need not have bothered.
Technorati Tags: Australia, defence, white paper, military, spin
With the leak (?) of a weak “final” draft (PDF) on the quadrennial defense review (QDR), the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have a big problem with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
That problem extends to the cancellation of the F-22.
The graphic below from the QDR draft shows that it disagrees with not only the USAF road map for the F-35 but also Mr. Gates unjustified cancellation of the F-22. Gates decision to cancel the F-22 was never based on sound evidence.
Yet, in the very beginning, Gates signs his name to the QDR draft. These people are willing to put the defense of the nation at risk and tell us that the water we feel on our back is rain. For example; Operation: USELESS DIRT in Afghanistan provides no credible defense for the United States. 911 was caused by poor airline and airport security along with poor control of non-U.S. citizens running on questionable or expired visas.
With that Gates and crew are willing to sell the crown jewels of Americas air power deterrence down the river based on pet theories and PowerPoint slides substituting for hard analysis.
The QDR draft suggests 6 air superiority wings for a total of 432 combat coded slots. Those slots can only be the property of the F-22. The F-35 is not an air superiority fighter and it never was designed to be. Given the next generation of AK-47 equivalent aircraft coming down the pike in the form of the SU-35 and PAK-FA (backed up by S300,S400 etc SAMs), the F-35 would be facing that threat with sub-parity capability.
–click here for a larger image–
Even more interesting is that if QDR is to believed, it calls for 720-792 combat coded “theater-strike-wing” aircraft. Assuming it ever gets past development problems, this can only be the F-35. This is far shy of the 1763 that the USAF wants to order.
Gates, the DOD and the USAF have not done any credible homework to come up with their requirements. All of this can only be fixed when Gates and his merry band of sycophants leave DOD service. The replacement for these people will have to include those with hard engineering and science skills. But for now, this is your DOD road map. It is a sham.
Technorati Tags: F-22, F-35, Gates, DOD, QDR, sham, military, budget
Just some thoughts on the leaked QDR draft as it applies to the USAF.
There really isn’t much substance to it. This should be shocking as a draft should have a fair portion of useful content.
In order for QDR to be effective in shaping the USAF, there has to be a better break-down of what the service needs to do to support the defense of the nation. Here is what should be mentioned at the minimum.
20 fighter groups (not wings) should be located around the U.S. to support the air sovereignty mission (ASA).
These groups will be run by the Air National Guard and have two squadrons of 12 aircraft for a total of 24. Note to those who don’t know the USAF structure, this is a lot smaller than the typical 24 and sometimes 18 fighter aircraft squadron.
One squadron will have the ASA mission as its primary duty and the other squadron will have the AEF (air expeditionary mission) as its primary duty. This is works because most deployed units are plugged to a composite Wing that is formed in-theater in time of expeditionary war.
This Air National Guard fighter structure should have the F-16—new build if needed—or the F-35 (if it works out). Grand total here; 480 combat coded aircraft.
If the F-22 production is truly canceled, then it needs to be taken off of the air-show circuit and standard in-public presence. We do not have the airframe life left in the aircraft for these kinds of things. All combat coded F-22 aircraft should be put in desert locations away from the public eye. They will no longer appear in joint air exercises or allied exercises. They should be used only for offensive war training. This will keep the aircraft running longer and keep upgrades to the platform non-public.
Develop the F-15 silent eagle and involve USAF in the USN UCAS-N program. R&D the FB-22. An FB-22 solution is critical if America wants to keep power projection ability into the future.
Keep a low rate production going of the silent eagle variant of the F-15E and plug them in as F-15Es retire.
Any completely offensive aircraft like the F-22, F-15E and A-10 (along with FB-22, UCAS-N and F-15SE) need to be run by the active duty and Air Force Reserve only.
This means that when a serious deployed war situation occurs, the F-22 and F-15E (along with FB-22, UCAS-N and F-15SE) will be the first to hit the tanker and get overseas.
Cancel the next-generation bomber fantasy in its present form and plug the money into new tankers. While bringing up tankers, the KC-135 fleet is getting worse than reported on age issues. Not mentioned much in the public is the re-engining effort for the fleet back in the 80’s that gave the airframe great power-plant efficiently. One of the skeletons in the closet is that we are many years after that re-engining effort and those motors are now showing age issues. So, lets point to a public consumption source to get this out in the air. It is pretty bad when you have to go to a foreign source to get the public consumption story straight. Key Publications Air Forces Monthly has in the last couple of years done a really good job of adopting the U.S. Air National Guard. AFM verifies the engine problems by stating “…according to maintenance personnel those engines are beginning to suffer interior de-lamination problems, with what one ANG member called ‘unpredictable’ results (Robert F. Dorr, In Crisis, AFM Dec. 2009, p60). The well known airframe age problems are becoming more expensive and risky. The KC-135 fleet is only one catastrophic failure event away from a total grounding.
USAF needs to keep refurbishing the “younger” C-5 aircraft. A requirement must be set to create a new modern version of the C-5.
Buy a number of off-the shelf 777-200LR aircraft. These aircraft can get special needs personnel and priority cargo from the states to a theater hub all in one hop without using up any air-to-air refueling assets. The C-17 is more tactical than strategic. It uses up too many tanker resources on intercontinental flights. Not a bad thing if you need the C-17 talent; bad if the mission doesn’t require C-17 talent. Many kinds of logistics can be moved without a C-17. Keep building C-17s at a low rate so there is a plan to put old C-17s in the bone yard on an acceptable schedule.
Kill the avionics improvement program for the old C-130s. What were C-130E age problems have been showing with the H. Keep building C-130Js. Copy the USMC Harvest Hawk program. This is a multi-functional C-130 that does NTISR, drogue tanking, and general cargo as needed with kits—just for you this-waritis fans. Diversifying airlift to the special talent of the airframe will save on fuel costs. The USAF consumes alarming amounts of fuel.
The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) community is hard to quantify in public consumption sources because we really do not know all the capability of those air-breathing and space-based reconnaissance systems.
What we do know is that while useful, Predator/Reaper class drones use up a lot of manpower. While there are several benefits of this class of drone and the persistence is great, it is the back-end workforce that USAF is still trying to figure out how to optimise. We haven’t reached the right balance of permissive air space ISR for drones vs. lets say, prop driven manned ISR like a King Air.
My feelings are that there is still some manpower to be grabbed to support drone ops by having the USAF stop doing Army-like duties such as convoys. If the Army needs more manpower for logistical back-end work, best to pull slots from the USMC which are doing Army like duties.
The same unknowns go for Special Operations. Although since helicopter rescue is part of Spec Ops, the PAVE HAWK is showing its age.
Back to the big bombers: the USAF can make a big manned bomber to penetrate a reasonable amount of IADs. However it is best to do two things to make that possible. Pull the nuke mission from long range bombers and build actual prototypes that are mostly functional to the production version. The idea that a production line has to be spooled up before the airframe is figured out (JSF et al) will not work here.
All the above, while not everything, is enough to show that QDR in relation to the USAF is intellectually bankrupt. Useless. If one wants to use the QDR to force-shape the USAF, they will do more harm than good.
Technorati Tags: QDR, USAF, DOD, military, FB-22
Operation: USELESS DIRT 2 really was a wasted effort if it produced this. Instead, it would be better to just tax it and make it a revenue stream for the government.
Technorati Tags: alcohol, iraq, Operation useless dirt, baghdad, taliban, religious nuts
H/T- JT
One of the guys that was responsible for the ill-fated Collins class sub program is now giving advice on how to avoid disaster for the Collins replacement.
Unfortunately the focus doesn’t include domestic subs as an option and plays on the lie that an off-the-shelf design would be unsuitable for Australia.
Written by retired Rear Admiral Oscar Hughes, who headed the Collins-class project from 1985 to 1993, the Defence-commissioned report of August 16 was obtained by The Weekend Australian under Freedom of Information laws.
The report warns that the government’s dream of building the futuristic submarines in Australia depends on urgent investment in “critical technologies” the country does not yet have.
“Currently, a number of these technologies are insufficiently developed to meet the future submarine capability requirements,” the report says.
“These include batteries, diesel engines and air independent propulsion – each requires further research and development and engineering investment.”
It details problems that plagued the building of the Collins-class submarines, including faulty combat systems and diesel engines, and warns that the lessons of these mistakes must be learned.
The report said that during their development, the Collins-class boats “experienced serious problems with diesel engines, including vibration, lack of power, broken gearboxes, injectors and fuel pumps . . . due to a lack of understanding of Australia’s ocean environment and a lack of engineering development”.
“Defence should, as a matter of priority, direct funds to R&D and engineering studies centered on battery and diesel engine technology, development and performance. Such investment and outcomes will be crucial.”
Not mentioned in the article is the poor state of the entrenched Defence bureaucracy that has huge troubles managing projects. The part that the DMO played in hobbling Australia’s sub fleet is significant. Without reform in the government procurement sector, any home grown sub is bound to get screwed up. According to the article, besides helping to secure R&D muscle, the other important responsibility of Defence will be to control the message.
The report goes beyond purely military matters and advises Defence on how to secure political support, control the media and handle the “very dirty” fight it says will inevitably break out over the nation’s largest defence project: the building of 12 new submarines in Adelaide. The report says criticism in the media of the Collins-class project in its early days “almost destroyed the project”.
It says Defence will need to employ a more savvy communications strategy. It warns companies will bid aggressively to win contracts and those that miss out will try to blame the government.
Of other interest in the report is that it recommends purchasing the combat system overseas. This is puzzling because a fix to sort out woes for the original Collins class combat system later went up for competitive trials. Two combat systems were up for consideration. One was the American developed AN/BYG-1 system. Australian industry offered to incorporate the far more advanced and working TDMS system for around $1.5M per boat.
In the end the American kit was selected to be the primary combat system. As of 2008, the TDMS did make it on to two of the boats as a back up system. In comparative trials with the American AN/BYG-1 system, both in manual and automatic modes, the Australian designed and developed TDMS system worked flawlessly.
The same cannot be said for the AN/BYG-1 system. In a proposed upgrade of the AN/BYG-1 system the automatic features which have been demonstrated by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation trials as not working, were deactivated. The taxpayer would pick up the bill for this downgrade.
The American system came with a high price and implied threat: use the U.S. system or get pushed out of super secret technology sharing. The price of the American system? About 250 times more than the Australian one. Costs as of circa 2008 were over $3 million invested in the Australian system and around $750 million invested in the American system. Some investigations by elected officials—or even the usually asleep-on-defence-issues Australian press—to see if this situation has improved would be useful.
It will be interesting to see what comes out of the pending RAND report.
Here is an extended PAK-FA that shows more detail of the aircraft.
Also an interesting view of what capability the PAK-FA may have once it reaches maturity.
Technorati Tags: PAK-FA, stealth, Russia
