Just some thoughts on the leaked QDR draft as it applies to the USAF.
There really isn’t much substance to it. This should be shocking as a draft should have a fair portion of useful content.
In order for QDR to be effective in shaping the USAF, there has to be a better break-down of what the service needs to do to support the defense of the nation. Here is what should be mentioned at the minimum.
20 fighter groups (not wings) should be located around the U.S. to support the air sovereignty mission (ASA).
These groups will be run by the Air National Guard and have two squadrons of 12 aircraft for a total of 24. Note to those who don’t know the USAF structure, this is a lot smaller than the typical 24 and sometimes 18 fighter aircraft squadron.
One squadron will have the ASA mission as its primary duty and the other squadron will have the AEF (air expeditionary mission) as its primary duty. This is works because most deployed units are plugged to a composite Wing that is formed in-theater in time of expeditionary war.
This Air National Guard fighter structure should have the F-16—new build if needed—or the F-35 (if it works out). Grand total here; 480 combat coded aircraft.
If the F-22 production is truly canceled, then it needs to be taken off of the air-show circuit and standard in-public presence. We do not have the airframe life left in the aircraft for these kinds of things. All combat coded F-22 aircraft should be put in desert locations away from the public eye. They will no longer appear in joint air exercises or allied exercises. They should be used only for offensive war training. This will keep the aircraft running longer and keep upgrades to the platform non-public.
Develop the F-15 silent eagle and involve USAF in the USN UCAS-N program. R&D the FB-22. An FB-22 solution is critical if America wants to keep power projection ability into the future.
Keep a low rate production going of the silent eagle variant of the F-15E and plug them in as F-15Es retire.
Any completely offensive aircraft like the F-22, F-15E and A-10 (along with FB-22, UCAS-N and F-15SE) need to be run by the active duty and Air Force Reserve only.
This means that when a serious deployed war situation occurs, the F-22 and F-15E (along with FB-22, UCAS-N and F-15SE) will be the first to hit the tanker and get overseas.
Cancel the next-generation bomber fantasy in its present form and plug the money into new tankers. While bringing up tankers, the KC-135 fleet is getting worse than reported on age issues. Not mentioned much in the public is the re-engining effort for the fleet back in the 80’s that gave the airframe great power-plant efficiently. One of the skeletons in the closet is that we are many years after that re-engining effort and those motors are now showing age issues. So, lets point to a public consumption source to get this out in the air. It is pretty bad when you have to go to a foreign source to get the public consumption story straight. Key Publications Air Forces Monthly has in the last couple of years done a really good job of adopting the U.S. Air National Guard. AFM verifies the engine problems by stating “…according to maintenance personnel those engines are beginning to suffer interior de-lamination problems, with what one ANG member called ‘unpredictable’ results (Robert F. Dorr, In Crisis, AFM Dec. 2009, p60). The well known airframe age problems are becoming more expensive and risky. The KC-135 fleet is only one catastrophic failure event away from a total grounding.
USAF needs to keep refurbishing the “younger” C-5 aircraft. A requirement must be set to create a new modern version of the C-5.
Buy a number of off-the shelf 777-200LR aircraft. These aircraft can get special needs personnel and priority cargo from the states to a theater hub all in one hop without using up any air-to-air refueling assets. The C-17 is more tactical than strategic. It uses up too many tanker resources on intercontinental flights. Not a bad thing if you need the C-17 talent; bad if the mission doesn’t require C-17 talent. Many kinds of logistics can be moved without a C-17. Keep building C-17s at a low rate so there is a plan to put old C-17s in the bone yard on an acceptable schedule.
Kill the avionics improvement program for the old C-130s. What were C-130E age problems have been showing with the H. Keep building C-130Js. Copy the USMC Harvest Hawk program. This is a multi-functional C-130 that does NTISR, drogue tanking, and general cargo as needed with kits—just for you this-waritis fans. Diversifying airlift to the special talent of the airframe will save on fuel costs. The USAF consumes alarming amounts of fuel.
The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) community is hard to quantify in public consumption sources because we really do not know all the capability of those air-breathing and space-based reconnaissance systems.
What we do know is that while useful, Predator/Reaper class drones use up a lot of manpower. While there are several benefits of this class of drone and the persistence is great, it is the back-end workforce that USAF is still trying to figure out how to optimise. We haven’t reached the right balance of permissive air space ISR for drones vs. lets say, prop driven manned ISR like a King Air.
My feelings are that there is still some manpower to be grabbed to support drone ops by having the USAF stop doing Army-like duties such as convoys. If the Army needs more manpower for logistical back-end work, best to pull slots from the USMC which are doing Army like duties.
The same unknowns go for Special Operations. Although since helicopter rescue is part of Spec Ops, the PAVE HAWK is showing its age.
Back to the big bombers: the USAF can make a big manned bomber to penetrate a reasonable amount of IADs. However it is best to do two things to make that possible. Pull the nuke mission from long range bombers and build actual prototypes that are mostly functional to the production version. The idea that a production line has to be spooled up before the airframe is figured out (JSF et al) will not work here.
All the above, while not everything, is enough to show that QDR in relation to the USAF is intellectually bankrupt. Useless. If one wants to use the QDR to force-shape the USAF, they will do more harm than good.
Technorati Tags: QDR, USAF, DOD, military, FB-22
To Eric,
The major problem I have with your QDR is that it makes WAY too much sense. Where is all the pork for our big poor defense contractors? How are they going to make a living?
Excellent ideas.
One addition I would make is that since we’ve always found roles for the B-52′s to fill, I’d re-engine them to cut down on maintenance costs and fuel usage, assuming current thinking keeps them around another 20-30 years. I don’t believe in keeping everything that is ancient flying, but until we have something that is as all-around good & multi-purpose as that airframe can be, then I don’t see the alternative. Same goes for the A-10.