The U.S. still needs answers for fighter roadmap problems

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) will be releasing their annual report on F-35 program progress within the next few weeks.

Given what we already know, I doubt it will show anything new. Yes it will be appreciated but there is such a mountain of evidence now showing severe program problems, that the top service chiefs and DOD bosses have a lot of explaining to do in relation to their negligence up to this point in time.

All services need a serious rethink on what they want as a fighter roadmap. The best thing that can happen is to start with a clean sheet of paper. Things like QDR are of little help.

For the USAF defining what is needed is easy. In the coming years they have 20 ASA locations to keep fit for the U.S. and territories. 10 AEF buckets is still a good idea. A reorg that includes making small, organic Fighter Groups (instead of Wings) that can be located to cover the 20 ASA areas and provide for the 10 AEFs is not a bad idea. It can be done.

The Navy needs to define how it really wants to use the carrier air wing in the coming years—ship building woes and all that. Knocking down the classic Hornet Squadron form 12 jets to 10 is a sign of the desperation and grief yet to come. Will they declare an 8 jet fighter squadron someday?

The Marines will probably get just enough done to have a show and tell of new STOVL fighters. The value of this and the quality of the platform is yet to be answered.

41 cents of every dollar in the U.S. federal budget is borrowed money.

A JASSM puzzle

This one has always confused me. It is a good read on the status of the JASSM program. You see, if some of the test missiles were only 200 feet off target, why didn’t the scene matching imager in the nose that is used in terminal phase, pick up the slack? Yet many faults were claimed to have been caused by “GPS drop-out”. Also interesting because INS kits for the day are pretty good and only need routine and not continuous GPS updating.

In test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four of four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of less than 60 percent. During tests on 30 April and 01 May 2007, three of the missiles missed by up to 200 feet, and a fourth failed to detonate on impact, a repeat of a previously-experienced fuze failure. Developers blamed the misses on “GPS dropout” that compromised the missile’s navigation system. The GPS receiver works with a very weak signal from fast-moving distant satellites, and some such dropouts are unavoidable. GPS dropout conditions may occur because of moving into an area with terrain blockage. At times there may be interference from other radio sources or even sunspot activity. When a GPS dropout does occur, navigation systems can give bad track. Following a GPS dropout, a receiver can require several seconds for reacquisition lock.

The program office developed a plan to solve the reliability problems by: (1) implementing a software change to the GPS receiver, (2) correcting a design flaw by moving a cable associated with the weapon’s anti-spoofing capability farther away from the engine, and (3) reworking the software code for a key data processor. The program office planned a minimum of nine ground tests in late 2007 and early 2008 as well as a 16-shot test-flight program in the February through mid-March 2008 time frame. These tests were expected to verify the planned improvements to JASSM’s reliability. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would evaluate the test results.

Following the test failures, the Air Force officially halted procurement of JASSM missiles in July 2007. No additional procurement would occur until the reliability improvements had been demonstrated. Of the 942 missiles on contract as of March 2008 (Lots 1-6) from the total planned buy of 4,900 baseline and ER variants, 611 have been delivered. According to program officials, if the planned tests validated JASSM’s reliability, the Air Force expected to restart procurement by renegotiating the Lot 7 buy.

The Government Accountability Office reported in a March 2008 assessment that the JASSM design was still not stable. The program office was not acquiring drawings, a measure of design stability, because the contractor had Total System Performance Responsibility wherein, according to program officials, the contractor guarantees the missile performance. Component problems supplied by sub-contractors include the missile’s electrical systems, warhead, and power system, as well as its guidance kit and engine components.

Warts and all, like Obi-won, it may be our only hope in the coming years—because of not enough F-22s—to hit important targets that are well defended by modern integrated air defenses. It is gold plated—as opposed to its “affordable” marketing spin—and the target better be worth the cost. This weapon is important in other ways because it can be carried by our long range bombers and get somewhere quicker than a Navy ship or sub with Tomahawk. While there is all of the this-waritis waste in the FY2010 and FY2011 budgets, there is a healthy amount of spending on this weapon. It will be a crutch for the USAF when no other resource is available in the coming years.

Blood in the water

The newsies have picked up this story about the MH/MRH-90 family of helicopters.(Defence’s new choppers are duds: report) It is a pretty sensitive subject here in Australia after the over $1 billion lost to the Seasprite debacle.

The Australian Defence Force said yesterday it could not respond to questions about the German report until tomorrow.

Officials from the German Defence Ministry said they had informed Eurocopter about the deficiencies and asked the company to correct them, UPI.com reported yesterday from Berlin.

Problems with the helicopters will cause alarm in the ADF and the government following the sorry saga of the Super Seasprite program. More than $1 billion was wasted on 11 Seasprite helicopters for the Royal Australian Navy that were never accepted for operational service.

The Howard government chose the MRH-90s, which are called NH90s in Europe, despite a long history of technical problems, including the navigation system and radar.

Its price tripled from initial estimates and delayed planning dates back to the 1980s.

Four of the helicopters bought by Australia have already been manufactured in Europe and two were delivered to Brisbane in December.

And, more on how Australian Navy helicopter requirements will get procured.

History can be a bitch

For the ill-fated F-35 program and it’s faith-based cheerleaders; history sucks.

Competition heats up for fighter contract Program moves forward with …
Dallas Morning News – NewsBank – Apr 2, 1998
The 6-year-old JSF program represents a new way of doing business for the … can’t cost more than $38 million, the Marine version, about $35 million. …

Common Sense Takes Off
Los Angeles Times – ProQuest Archiver – Nov 10, 2001
… reducing unit costs to about $35 million, a steep price for a Buick but pretty … The JSF idea began in the early 1990s with a joint political and …

NAVY NOT RULING OUT STOVL JSF FOR CARRIERS.
Defense Daily – AccessMyLibrary.com – Feb 22, 1999
… for its conventional take-off and landing version of JSF is $28 million … on spending between $30 million and $35 million for each STOVL aircraft. …

New leader of Lockheed Martin’s quest for fighter contract prizes …
Fort Worth Star-Telegram – NewsBank – Aug 17, 1998
The JSF is expected to come in at a per-plane cost ranging from $28 million to $35 million. The F-16 currently runs up to $24 million. …

Wording

This language would have to show up in a NY Times Op-Ed. It was bound to happen. It had to happen eventually. Remember what was said about the F-22.

The solution is simple: we need a unified national security budget. That would let lawmakers see that, for example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a next-generation aircraft that is not needed in the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is projected to consume more money than the entire Coast Guard in 2011. Yet the F-35 program has suffered so many cost and technical problems that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates just fired its manager. Such inefficiencies and disparities are obvious when compared directly, but they get blurred when the Coast Guard and the other services are considered under different budgets and by different sets of Congressional committees.

Emphasis mine.