The U.S. Government Office (GAO) has release a report on a variety of U.S. defense programs and their health. The results are what you would expect; lots of ill performance.
The EA-18G was approved for full-rate production in November 2009, prior to deficiencies identified during operational testing being fully resolved. In operational tests, the Navy rated the EA-18G operationally effective and operationally suitable; however, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the aircraft to be operationally effective for most missions and not operationally suitable.
This difference can be primarily attributed to how the organizations accounted for the poor reliability of the ALQ-99 jamming pod. In addition, the simultaneous operation of the active electronically scanned array radar and the airborne electronic attack suite degraded the radar’s performance in certain situations. Despite these shortcomings, most aircraft were either procured or funds were requested prior to a full-rate production decision.
Technology and Design Maturity
All of the EA 18-G’s technologies are mature and its design is stable.
Production Maturity
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not collect statistical process control data. We have previously expressed concerns about the EA-18G’s aggressive production schedule.
The current EA-18G program of record includes 88 aircraft. A full-rate production decision was made in November 2009. The Navy has scheduled follow-on operational test and evaluation for spring of 2010 which will allow full evaluation of new software, as well as other actions to improve current suitability problems. Prior to the full-rate production decision, 56 aircraft were procured.
Funding for an additional 22 aircraft was requested in the fiscal year 2010 budget even though the operational test reports by the DOT&E had not yet been published.
Other Program Issues
The Navy test organization and DOT&E have reached different conclusions about the operational effectiveness and suitability of the EA-18G.
The Navy assessed the EA-18G as operationally effective and identified one negative warfighting effect—poor ALQ-99 reliability. It also rated the EA- 18G as operationally suitable but identified a total of seven major deficiencies. The Navy testers recommended fleet introduction of the EA-18G and noted that follow-on tests would be used to demonstrate that deficiencies had been corrected.
DOT&E’s independent assessment found the EA-18G to be operationally effective for most, but not all missions, due to the excessive time required to make reactive jamming assignments.
In addition, during tests, electromagnetic interference in some frequency bands from the EA-18G’s airborne electronic attack (AEA) suite degraded active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar performance. The Navy operational testers did not consider this a deficiency because the capability production document only required independent operations of the AESA and AEA systems. DOT&E noted this deficiency in their operational effectiveness assessment.
Also, DOT&E found that the EA-18G was not operationally suitable, due to significant problems with the built-in-test (BIT). A high rate of false BIT indications frequently led to a lack of aircrew confidence in the AEA system health, which can impact the decision on whether or not to take the aircraft on a given mission.
At times, the aircrews flew missions with real faults because the high rate of false indications led them to disregard BIT. The EA-18G also exhibited low reliability, due primarily to the frequent failure of the legacy ALQ-99 jamming pods and their newly designed pod interface units.
Tests also found that EA-18G aircraft speed was reduced when carrying the ALQ-99 pods and external weapons, limiting its ability to keep up with the strike aircraft it was escorting. The legacy ALQ-99 pods were not considered in the Navy’s assessment of the EA-18G. DOT&E further found that pilots in the two-person EA-18G have an increased workload versus the EA- 6B four-person crew.
In some missions the workload was acceptable, but the workload for performing radar and communications jamming for missions with modified escort profiles was close to exceeding aircrew’s abilities to maintain required functionality or effectiveness.
The Navy test organization and DOT&E recommended further tests to address deficiencies found in operational tests.
In late September 2009, the program started to determine if software upgrades were effective in correcting the EA-18G’s major deficiencies. The DOT&E report contained recommendations to improve the EA-18G and make the aircraft fully effective and suitable and increase survivability. They include upgrading the pilot tactical situation display to minimize aircrew workload management comparable to the EA-6B, upgrading hardware and software diagnostics tools, assessing the benefits of a threat warning system, and assessing the safety and performance benefits of adding higher performance engines to the EA-18G.
Program Office Comments
The program office stated the fleet continues to transition to the EA-18G Growler aircraft. The verification of correction test period has ended and the program office is awaiting the report of test results. The verification of corrections will be available prior to the first deployment of the EA- 18G.
