The U.S. Government Office (GAO) has release a report on a variety of U.S. defense programs and their health. The results are what you would expect; lots of ill performance.
Some time back I wrote about the diet coke approach the Navy used to field the F/A-18G electronic support version of the Super Hornet. The Navy chose style over substance.
The latest GAO read (PDF) on the status of this program shows that anything is possible if you are willing to lower your expectations. Here is what they wrote.
The EA-18G was approved for full-rate production in November 2009, prior to deficiencies identified during operational testing being fully resolved. In operational tests, the Navy rated the EA-18G operationally effective and operationally suitable; however, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the aircraft to be operationally effective for most missions and not operationally suitable.
This difference can be primarily attributed to how the organizations accounted for the poor reliability of the ALQ-99 jamming pod. In addition, the simultaneous operation of the active electronically scanned array radar and the airborne electronic attack suite degraded the radar’s performance in certain situations. Despite these shortcomings, most aircraft were either procured or funds were requested prior to a full-rate production decision.
Technology and Design Maturity
All of the EA 18-G’s technologies are mature and its design is stable.
Production Maturity
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not collect statistical process control data. We have previously expressed concerns about the EA-18G’s aggressive production schedule.
The current EA-18G program of record includes 88 aircraft. A full-rate production decision was made in November 2009. The Navy has scheduled follow-on operational test and evaluation for spring of 2010 which will allow full evaluation of new software, as well as other actions to improve current suitability problems. Prior to the full-rate production decision, 56 aircraft were procured.
Funding for an additional 22 aircraft was requested in the fiscal year 2010 budget even though the operational test reports by the DOT&E had not yet been published.
Other Program Issues
The Navy test organization and DOT&E have reached different conclusions about the operational effectiveness and suitability of the EA-18G.
The Navy assessed the EA-18G as operationally effective and identified one negative warfighting effect—poor ALQ-99 reliability. It also rated the EA- 18G as operationally suitable but identified a total of seven major deficiencies. The Navy testers recommended fleet introduction of the EA-18G and noted that follow-on tests would be used to demonstrate that deficiencies had been corrected.
DOT&E’s independent assessment found the EA-18G to be operationally effective for most, but not all missions, due to the excessive time required to make reactive jamming assignments.
In addition, during tests, electromagnetic interference in some frequency bands from the EA-18G’s airborne electronic attack (AEA) suite degraded active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar performance. The Navy operational testers did not consider this a deficiency because the capability production document only required independent operations of the AESA and AEA systems. DOT&E noted this deficiency in their operational effectiveness assessment.
Also, DOT&E found that the EA-18G was not operationally suitable, due to significant problems with the built-in-test (BIT). A high rate of false BIT indications frequently led to a lack of aircrew confidence in the AEA system health, which can impact the decision on whether or not to take the aircraft on a given mission.
At times, the aircrews flew missions with real faults because the high rate of false indications led them to disregard BIT. The EA-18G also exhibited low reliability, due primarily to the frequent failure of the legacy ALQ-99 jamming pods and their newly designed pod interface units.
Tests also found that EA-18G aircraft speed was reduced when carrying the ALQ-99 pods and external weapons, limiting its ability to keep up with the strike aircraft it was escorting. The legacy ALQ-99 pods were not considered in the Navy’s assessment of the EA-18G. DOT&E further found that pilots in the two-person EA-18G have an increased workload versus the EA- 6B four-person crew.
In some missions the workload was acceptable, but the workload for performing radar and communications jamming for missions with modified escort profiles was close to exceeding aircrew’s abilities to maintain required functionality or effectiveness.
The Navy test organization and DOT&E recommended further tests to address deficiencies found in operational tests.In late September 2009, the program started to determine if software upgrades were effective in correcting the EA-18G’s major deficiencies. The DOT&E report contained recommendations to improve the EA-18G and make the aircraft fully effective and suitable and increase survivability. They include upgrading the pilot tactical situation display to minimize aircrew workload management comparable to the EA-6B, upgrading hardware and software diagnostics tools, assessing the benefits of a threat warning system, and assessing the safety and performance benefits of adding higher performance engines to the EA-18G.
Program Office Comments
The program office stated the fleet continues to transition to the EA-18G Growler aircraft. The verification of correction test period has ended and the program office is awaiting the report of test results. The verification of corrections will be available prior to the first deployment of the EA- 18G.
You should also see how the Navy is trying to operationally get the Growler into Afghanistan as soon as, and as inefficiently as, possible to get an idea of just how bizarre things can look down the rabbit hole.
Although on one hand I think some cleaving of the problems resident in the ALQ-99 and resident in the EA-18G airframe should be made. Due to the nature of the EW mission a dedicated platform is not affordable, and the Prowlers are just not operable or very maintainable anymore and the airframes are screaming for replacement. The EA-18G airframe is pretty much all that’s out there for the Navy, there’s no real other option.
This leads to getting more bang for our buck focusing on the problems inherent in the ALQ-99. Beyond the cited poor reliability there are many, many other reasons why the Next Gen Jammer is needed soonest.
NGJ + EA-18G may not equal best jamming system imaginable, but will equal best tactical jamming system projected to exist anywhere in the world for foreseeable future. ALQ-99 + EA-18G equals stop-gap driven more by maintenance and operability aging airframe issues, and is hopefully a temporary marriage.
And P.S. these are my *personal* observations, your mileage may vary . . .
I guess no warplane program will work for Mr. Eric.
Come on, this is the “off the shelf” something is better than nothing thinking that is usually praised to high heaven here. I mean, in the F-35 threads, commentators say we should go back to buying F-16s for the foreseeable future, because they’re tried and true. And we need something that works right now, instead of a pie in the sky program for the future.
And guess what, the Navy did just that. Only, as the report above indicates, sometimes the tried and true isn’t all that good.
The Navy’s decision to rush the F/A – 18G into service makes sense. They needed to replace the Prowlers because of airframe fatigue, and they weren’t going to wait for the NGJ. Using the ALQ-99 is a stopgap, a temporary solution until the next generation of jammers comes online.
The real story is that the Growler was Hobson’s Choice. What ELSE was available?
Doubtful it qualifies for Hobsons. What it does qualify for is more of the same kind of effort we have seen before: Why can’t Daddy program manage?
It also doesn’t qualify for “off the shelf” as it is cobbled together and doesn’t work so well. Pretty paint job though.
Wait, so a program counts as being “off the shelf” only if it already works? No wonder “off the shelf” programs never fail, because, only programs that succeed can qualify as being “off the shelf.”
What part of the Growler is not off the shelf? The airframe? The Jammer? The only not “off the shelf” element is the integration of the two. And, from what the document says, the problems are not surprising. For example, who knew that jamming would be difficult for only two people? (Everyone) And, who knew that an old jammer, the ALQ-99, would have reliability problems? (We all do, at least those who understand the word lifespan) Who knew that carrying extra stores outside an older and flawed airframe would lead to more drag? Who knew that designing and building new interfaces might have some problems?
I don’t see anything in that report that dooms the Growler. Instead, it looks like entirely predictable flaws that really could have been seen before the Growler was finished. The drag is unavoidable, the integration issues can only be found through actually using the platform.
These difficulties are another example of accepting the 80% solution. Instead of waiting for the perfect NGJ and a perfect airframe, the Pentagon and the Navy went for something now. And it doesn’t work perfectly, quelle surprise.
I can understand the distress that this program difficulties causes. I mean, what can the various proponents of the ‘tried and true’ do, when it has been demonstrated that even the tried and true face difficulties? Fundamentally, people need to understand that new programs bring with the risk of difficulties. And, unless you do not want to innovate at all, you have to accept that there will be problems.
But I thought the incremental approach was a foolproof method of development! Have I been led astray, oh interwebs?
Well I guess in some cases, incrementally shooting one’s foot over and over probably won’t be too helpful.
So, are you saying that this program has shot itself in the foot repeatedly? How?
Hi Ankady… consider all of the work that had to be done to incorporate (not just the 99 pods but other systems) everything into the airframes.
The Growler has a complete add-on of additional wiring above and beyond the F as well as a bunch of other gear. So it isn’t just slapping 99s on to an airframe.
Well 1310, I guess it depends on your definition of successful. Certainly the Navy has done so. Consider too how the Navy continually said that the 99s were not good enough and yet had to go with them anyway….
PowerPoint warriors unite. This from 7 years ago.
http://i231.photobucket.com/albums/ee54/warpigelp/992.jpg
http://i231.photobucket.com/albums/ee54/warpigelp/991.jpg
Eric
I think the Navy is going with the “theory of constraints” on this one. The Prowler airframe and ALQ-99 system are both long poles, with the Prowler airframe being the longer one. Given constrained resources the Navy has decided to spend money to replace the airframe first as that is deemed more critical. Plus, it will help to gain some experience with operating the AESA, ALQ-218, USQ-113, etc. on a new airframe to understand the EM compatibility issues and feed that forward into the NGJ design. Yes, it would be better if NGJ were here now. Yes, not every decision made by the program office can in retrospect (or perhaps even at the time) be considered the best. Yes, NGJ is not a done deal. But resource constraints forced the Navy to make sequencing decisions and in the big scheme of things going with a new airframe first and (by G-d hopefully or else were SOL) the NGJ second is not the worst way to go about it.
I was kinda shocked a couple of days ago when I found out that even the EA-18G with NGJ will only be used as stand-off jammer, not as escort jammer! That is plain crazy.
Unless you want to go downtown, with S-300s and fighters with missiles vectored onto your jamming signals.
Given the advances in modern air defenses, its not surprising that the jammer will stay out of the way of missiles, or at least at the extreme edges.
With the jamming pods, its unlikely that you’ll have a lot of maneuverability. Furthermore, it appears that only stealth will go downtown in the future (see the video on the Dew Line blog), so a non stealthy hornet won’t be even allowed into the threat area.
Hullo! I hope you advocate a more sophisticated approach than brute force noise. That wasn’t healthy already in winter ’44 over the Reich.
I’m aware that a Growler can’t go supersonic and isn’t the most agile thing, the question is a loaded SHornet? I say if the Growler can’t be used as escort jammer then NavAir is one more step closer to managing itself out of business. Then better put the pods under a Global Hawk or Reaper incarnation.
Without escort jamming there is very little chance that a legacy design can survive against a modern integrated air defence!
If the threats it faces are a legacy IADS like Allied Force 1999, A team of Super Hornets E/F/G backed up by a lot of tanker gas, will get the job done.These are not the threats I worry about.
Don’t forget AARGM will have to be part of the overall “system of systems” for EW and that the Allied Force experience played a role in defining that system. Which, is another one you can point to of not being the best managed thing in the world BTW.
Hearing complaints on this blog about the EF/A-18G are ridiculous.
What other Jammer would the Navy have built. Really, is there any other carrier capable jammer in the whole wide world that is in production? Is there any other electronic attack fighter in production? (Please, enlighten me, I honestly cannot think of any western electronic attack plane being produced right now) Do you honestly advocate restarting the A-6 line?
I know that there was substantial wiring to be done, such is the case, when you’re creating a new system from “off the shelf” parts. If it was brand new, there wouldn’t be any new wiring, because the wiring would already be installed.
By your logic, Eric, the Navy should have bought a brand new fighter, with brand new Jammers, and had it work perfectly from day one.
Does anyone suggest that the Navy should not have bought the Growler right now, it should have continued to use the EA-6s until the NGJ was completed? You’re complaints about this program are faintly unbelievable.
Yes, the Navy and the USAF should have invested in EA long before now, we all know that. But, one cannot rebuild electronic attack in a day. This was the incremental position. The halfway hang out between EA-6s and EF-35s and attendant EA UAVs. It was the cheap option, the non gold plated option. It was the 80% solution, the we need it now, not 5 years in the future. The, lets have a plane, not a power point presentation.
It was always the gap filler, no one denied that. Even the power points for the Growler say that the party piece will be the NGJ, not the ALQ-99.
The Navy, to its credit, built something, instead of waiting years for the future. This program is the antithesis of the F-35. Both try to address a present and future need, and both go about it in completely different ways. And yet, because there are some difficulties with this program, you condemn it?
I had expected better of this blog. I thought that there would be understanding of engineering complexity. I thought that there would be commendations for accepting a present solution, instead of trying for something that’s 5 years down the road. I thought that you would at least accept that the Navy, instead of the air force, is building something, anything.
Instead, its mockery. It appears that you’ve lost, in the years of facing the issues with the F-35, any sense of the possible. I repeat my critique from many times before, weapon systems don’t spring fully formed, tested, and combat proven from the head of the Air Power Australia guys. They have to be built, by humans, and that means there will be problems. They will have teething problems, they will have software problems, etc.
I would be content, if the author of this blog accepted that these issues cannot be entirely eliminated. That would make his complaints about the F-35 much more powerful, but it appears that won’t happen.
It’s not in production anymore but a lot of people forget that the West also fields the Tornado ECR. I want to say both the Luftwaffe and Italian AF still fly it. Not quite as capable as EA-6B or Growler, but at least is a tactical electronic attack aircraft of some flavor.
Really not sure/convinced how an EF-35 is going to work. Not surprised at all that going from 3 ECMO’s to 1 and a pilot is a problem for task saturation in the Growler vice Prowler. Extend that to a single seat airframe and the whole EF-35 concept strikes me as slightly bizarre . . .
A jamming F-35 is not going to be very good. It’ll probably have to rely on entirely automating the jamming process, to avoid overwhelming the pilot.
I think, that if the Navy and Air Force build a two seater jet for the F – X competition, that’ll be a perfect platform for a jammer.
More likely, the jammers that go downtown will be UAVs armed with EMP bombs and automated Jammers. Or MALD-J’s who’ll be sent on a suicide mission to protect the airplanes / cruise missiles. While legacy fighters or something new will Jam from stand off positions.
Finally, a jammer needs to be wired to let the crew control the jammers. Suggestions that just strapping on the jammers onto a normal plane will lead to anything sufficient or even good is comical.
All good points.
Although if you ever read “Clashes” about the air war in Vietnam back then simplified jammers on F-105′s when employed with good formation tactics, given the lobes of the jammer, provided sometimes effective “point defense” if you will. Of course that was vs the SA-2 and ZSU-23-4. I wouldn’t write off integral jammers tied into the RWR systems with some smart control software being able to provide some degree of protection to fighter/strike aircraft. Of course, probably not as good as a dedicated platform with people in the loop, but were I a pilot and given the choice, I don’t think I’d turn down the integral jammer with an “on/off/auto” switch or something similar.
To ArkadyRenko:
Don’t bother asking questions, I raised the exact same question a few months ago, what else do you guys want to buy? Everybody here B**tchs about how F35 is garbage, SH is a pig, Growler is a sled, drones can’t survive, Russians will buy 1000s PAKFA by 2020 and will shoot down everything for the next 50 years including Santa Claus, etc……
ProwlerAMDO:
Thanks for mentioning the Tornado. The latest RAF version the EF3 has been very effective when combined with the ALARM missile. I might also add it can still break the sound barrier, unlike the Growler which is limited to operations below Mach 1.
Flat out – what ever fixes need to be made to ensure effective, minimized 2-man workload and increased reliability, as a STOPGAP measure, needs to be done. No arguments. Navy should absolutely tackle these interim must-fix upgrades ASAP. Good for GAO, once again.
Equally, NGJ should be funded/procured as soon as maturity can be achieved – which should be made high priority for the two competition phase winners soon to be selected. No questions there.
Two good reasons why the budget-cannibalizing F-35C has to wait… i.e. critical money is needed to fund essential near-term enabling must have capabilities per requirements.
The upgraded engine feasibility study (included towards the end of recommendations) sounds fascinating, really. Greater fleet wide upgrade and enahanced future mod possibilities there.
Regarding: what’s the ‘proper’ airframe question?!? Agreed, it’s a bit late, but absolutely a 2-seat multi-purpose FB-22Xn joint USAF/USN frame could fulfill that increased endurance, higher performance capability and more by perhaps 2018-2020 as a cheaper and more flexible alternative to the NGB.
Either that or restart the Vigilante line and crank out 3x F414 engined EA-5E/recon (secondary interceptor role) ‘Wowers’, already.
Wait,
Because there are problems with the growler, you want to build a brand new fighter or restart an old one?
Come on, I thought everyone here wanted the minimalist solution.
To Prowler’s comment, integral jammers will be useful, but I believe that those strike package escorting jammers will most likely either be drones or MALD-Js. I don’t think that the USN or the USAF wants to put a manned jammer into the hot area.
Do you, Geogen, actually believe that the Navy isn’t trying to fix these issues? Of course they are. They just wanted a jammer before they reached “perfection.”
RSF: does the Tornado launch from carriers? Is the Tornado airplane line open? Do you want to do the expensive fundamental airframe modifications to make those two events happen?
With the Growler, all they had to do was rewire the plane, they didn’t have to restart decades old plane production or fundamentally modify something.
Next of all, of course they’re working on the NGJ, but that’ll take time. And it’ll be expensive and it’ll be filled with development difficulties and expensive new technology.
Given what’s been said here, I’d be surprised if some people here would actually support NGJ, if they knew the new technology going into it. When reports come of NGJ cost overruns, just wait, there will be comments saying that the ALQ-99 was good enough, and we didn’t need a gold plated solution…
I was more imagining integral jammers on any new build non all aspect stealth fighter/strike aircraft, or retrofitted to F-15SE, F-18E/F Block II+, F-16E/F Block50/52, etc. in case anyone needed them to go “downtown” against a modern IADS. The integral jammer would add at least a thin layer of possible protection, but would have to feature a pretty advanced design that cues off a good RWR like an AN/ALR-94 derivative. However even in this “worst case” scenario you’d want Growler support and B-2, F-22 and anything else you have with all aspect stealth going against the double digit SAMs.
That’s why I’m interested in the Navy’s recently released RFI for a stealthy ISR/Strike UAV that can fly off carriers. The Navy desperately needs something with all aspect stealth that’s survivable in the first day of the war to start hunting and dismantling S-300 sites, etc.
“Do you, Geogen, actually believe that the Navy isn’t trying to fix these issues? Of course they are.”
Arkady –
I didn’t have that information. It’s good to hear then, that USN is “…upgrading the pilot tactical situation display to minimize aircrew workload management” as you confirm for us. For starters.
Making the fixes would imho make a critical and essential stopgap solution to interim EA requirements, especially before NGJ is operational.
In addition to that, yes, a new 2-seat platform better equipped for the role could and should imo be funded for a mid-term 2020+ next gen jamming capacity. My current choice is a joint USAF/USN FB-22x which can be wired to amplify NGJ’s potential as well as better keep up with cruise speeds and work the legs. FB-22x would conceivably come out of the NGB budget, which is a new platform, but could be a force-enhancing and multiplying ‘interim’ asset in the mid-term at perhaps 1/2 the Program cost. If strategic and geopolitical requirements still demanded a serious and robust ‘heavy’ bomber replacement by say 2035 (God forbid), then the 2035 Bomber development concept would by default kick in.
we are going WAY back with the Vigilante, cleanest looking Navy jet ever, right size for the job though but probably would cost $500 million a piece….
one of the reasons I am against new build fighter a la FB22, F/A-XX,etc.. is going to be the cost, anybody believe we can build a cheap fighter in the US?
Nico –
Yeah, maybe that wishful EA-5E would only be an April fools alternative, point taken.
Re: joint USAF/USN FB22x concept, sure it would obviously be costly, but again one should stress the point til blue in face, it would be a bargain alternative to NGB and potential alternate to F/A-XX. Further, USN would require fewer F-35C (if not scrapping altogether). Upgrade Super Horns.
That would be an arguably far cheaper and more capable solution (noting joint development, consolidated program), taking USN out to say 2035 taking into account potential UCAV mix as well. The spiral block developed FB22x concept that is.
In short, it could be multiples greater than what the Vigilante ever provided – be the Vigilante that wasn’t. (and yep, complementing (leapfrogging) Growler in 10 yrs).
RSF – dont know why you want it to go past M1.0 , given the platform is going to be loitering at a stand off distance, most likely at endurance speed which is going to be around M0.5-M0.6. Also unsure as to why it is critical given it is outside the operating envelope of the -99 pod. Sounds pretty stupid to me – lets go M1.0+, burn all my fuel, and not give the jamming support that my bro’s require!
Secondly, how quick do you reckon that a F-16 is going to go in Mil thrust with 2x external bags, 3x jamming pods, 1xaim120, 1x harm…..
My my, Eric has touched a sensitive spot with this, perhaps we can all return to better behavior?
ArkadyRenko: Yes the F-18 launches from carrier decks, does that make the growing list of engineering compromises that are starting to hobble this otherwise excellent plane any less important? I don’t recall seeing say the Rafale having any of these issues. Further more, how many different types of SEAD/DEAD aircraft have we built to this point (Raven, Prowler, etc)? Why did someone not have enough brains to see if the AESA radar and the ALQ-99 jamming pods interfered with each other before putting these aircraft in production?
Steve: The issue is the types of threats that we face now require speed to be able to escape when warranted. Like the 8 battalions of S300 PMU-2 missiles now covering the entire straight of Taiwan with a Mach 6 SAM missile with a 120 ml range. I don’t dispute your comments about a loaded F-16. It just seems to me we could do better at this point.
How about dusting off those rewinged A-6′s the Navy dumped that still had plenty of life in them? Return of the EA-6A
RSF, let me get this straight.
Does an electronic attack variant of the Rafale exist? One that can be launched from a carrier? No. When you build an electronic attack airplane, it will be different from a normal fighter. Because, electronic attack requires more sensors and electronics. That should be obvious.
For a air force orientated blog, the basic understanding of technology’s limitations appears to be quite limited.
The F-18 has fundamental flaws, namely the stores have to be angled outwards. Unless you want to spend millions of dollars fixing that, you have to make do with what you have.
And, do you know what’s surprising, big jammers cause lots of drag. (/ sarcasm) Of course the Growler was going to go slower. But, the Navy doesn’t need it to go downtown. They’ll be using stealthy drones or expendable decoys for the jamming over the target area.
And, RSF, I’m sure that someone knew that the AESA would be affected by the jammer. If you had followed the Growler’s development, you’ll remember that they wanted to fix the radios too, to avoid electronic fratricide. The lack of an AESA while jamming is not surprising, nor should it be a game changer. Its just an electronic fact of life.
About the SAMs over the strait, that’s why the Growler will stay outside of SAM range. Because, it won’t have the maneuverability to go into same range. Unless you build a very expensive, very high powered platform, you won’t have the maneuverability and the jamming capability.
Per Prowler’s comment, I believe that all modern fighters will have some form of built in jamming. The F-35 can jam through its AESA, which of course is not the greatest capability, but its something. I agree with you on this point. All fighter’s and bombers that do go downtown should have some form of electronic attack built in to accompany the escorting EA drones, etc.
Anonymoose: so, the Navy should never replace the EA-6s? The navy should spend a fortune getting those airframes fixed up, then rewiring them for the NGJ. And don’t forget, the EA-6s aren’t maneuverable against S-300s either, so you can’t expect those to go downtown.
Really, the comments here are more luddite then thoughtful. That’s why I’m so upset. This Growler issue has revealed some people here to be utterly incapable of giving any praise or recognizing any challenges.
Praise….. lets see… nice paint job and new car smell…. great for Allied Force IADS…..
Nope. Sorry. Next gen showing up will still mean the G is the wrong airframe for coming threats. It can hardly keep up with the rest of the Hornet community so its utility as an escort jammer doesn’t offer much. If the Navy ever does see the F-35C, that jet won’t hang around much for off-platform jamming support.
Have a look here at the difficulty of taking out mobile threats…in this case we won–(it was legacy IADS)…. now replace that with S-300 and better and we don’t really have a solution unless you want to just throw cruise missiles at the problem and forget manned air in stiff IADS….
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html
Eric
In all honesty what would you do? Forget budgetary constraints for a moment if you will, what’s your preferred solution?
The Kosovo link is interesting in that you have a race set up to see which side becomes a self licking ice cream cone first, the Serbs by not illuminating their radars very often and taking ballistic shots (leading to the 2 kills for 800 SAMs fired) or the allies which are forced into maintaining a larger percentage of the force for SEAD to try to suppress a Serbian air defense force “in being” that seemed more interested in staying alive than defending serbian airspace. Perhaps I’m missing something but I don’t see how this article really backs up your point, although it’s a good read and generally on topic to the thread. How much good would a double digit IADS do if they copied Serbian tactics of rarely illuminating, other than again forcing a larger percentage of the allied force to be dedicated to SEAD/DEAD but with the allied air strikes still getting through? I know the S-300 radars work different than single digit in general, but the article strikes me as far more about tactics than technology. Just my two cents.
But am seriously interested in what you would propose. My apologies if you already posted elsewhere.
ArkadyRenko:
Perhaps you missed the praise when I said ” otherwise excellent plane” in reference to the Growler/Super Hornet.
The Rafale does have an excellent jamming system, the Thales Spectra, although it’s for self defense, not stand off or escort jamming.
So in essence you are saying that since the Prowler, and now the Growler are limited to subsonic operations, and have jamming pods which cause drag, that this is normal and desirable? Can I point out that the EF-111A Raven had a dash speed over Mach 2, and carried the same ALQ-99 system that the Prowler, and now the Growler uses?
And if someone knew about the problems when operating the APG-79 and ALQ-99, why were 56 aircraft procured? I can see several reasons why not having the AESA active when jamming might be a problem.
Did you know that many of the new Russian/Chinese missiles when jammed, flip over to passive receiving mode, and home in on the nearest jamming signal? If I was a Growler Pilot, I think I might like knowing that I had an incoming missile to worry about. And what about operating in an active environment when enemy fighters are hunting?
I think the Growler can work as an interim jamming platform, but this mess with the competing electronic systems, and a setup that overwhelms the crew needs to be sorted out. And this continued purchasing of aircraft that don’t work, or work poorly needs to stop!
RSF
It is plainly clear that the USN wants the replace the ALQ-99 ASAP. They haven’t repaired them, they aren’t interested in upgrading the ALQ-99s. They want the NGJ and believe that upgrading the ALQ-99 will be a waste of money.
Now, why would you want supersonic dash capability, if the jamming will only be stand off jamming? Why spend money on an expensive capability, when, as you correctly stated above, the life expectancy of jammers in a defended airspace is very low? Its not hard to imagine why only UAVs or decoys will be jammers downtown. Its because they’re going to be prime targets.
And finally, what airframe right now would replace the Growler? Non. You will have to spend billions of dollars to develop another airframe, either the FB-22 or a super hornet block III. And, given the commentators on this blog, those airframes will be denounced, the moment they have any sort of development difficulty.
And yes, the Growler is the interim solution. That’s not surprising. And yet, this blog which daily cries for interim solutions instead of the F-35, denounces it. Hypocritical much?
More like– Project management much?
Saying the G is a solution borders on being a joke unless you want to face half-broken down IADS.
Even with NGJ it will be a slow- draggy escort jammer that isn’t going to be very effective with out quantites of powerful stand-off jammers backing it up.
But hey, this is from the crew that brought us LCS and other kinds of successful groupthink.
Of interest to me is the Chinese development in 2009 of a JH-7 variant for SEAD missions. How effective its jamming systems are is an open question, but it makes you wonder why they would need this aircraft??
http://cnair.top81.cn/attack/JH-7_67a.jpg
Good question, RSF.
The reported KNIRTI SAP-14 Escort jammer system, coupled w/ the Cy-34 platform, should also be of interest and worth watching, imo. Reportedly being adapted for certain Su-30xx airframes as well..
Credit to APA site on that point. Worth the read if one’s interested in the Su-34 and development of jamming in general.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Fullback.html
Geogen:
These Russian jammers are huge and powerful, with state of the art electronics vs. the old cold war days.
The SU-34 Fullback is an amazing strike fighter with dangerous capabilities. Strange to see a Russian strike fighter optimized and fitted with a Thales Damocles ground attack pod!
And its interesting to see that both the latest Russian (SU-34) and Chinese (JH-7B) strike platforms are capable of supersonic speeds when needed!