The Australian National Audit Office does do a good job but a little more detail discribing a program that has development problems would be helpful. For instance, more details of how we got where we are today with a late and incomplete Boeing Wedgetail would be nice. The purpose being so that we can avoid these problems in future programs, a valueble contribution to our tribal knowledge and all that…

This recent report by ANAO mentions the following about the “major challenges” of the Wedgetail program.

“Initial planning for the project was optimistic, resulting in an aggressive schedule that had been compressed to such a high level that there was no margin for re-work or risks being realised”.

This really needs more detail. What whats missed (or left out) by the ANAO is that early on in the planning of the Wedgetail program, scores of items that were “risks”, were cast off and ignored. THIS is what brings us our “challenges” today. And not only the vendor issues, but shouldn’t the DMO—for which Australians pay billions into—be more aware of these things? Why can’t Daddy program manage?

.

The attached file below is a great piece of history from 2002. In it is an F-35 program brief to the Australian press.

Excuse the words that are not spelled correctly as I imagine it is a bad transcribing job from audio. I have marked items of interest by highlighting them in yellow and in one case also in bold. You will find some very interesting claims. This is the kind of information that convinced the Australian Defence establishment at the time, to go with the F-35 program. Where all this will lead is anyone’s guess.

2002AusJSFpressBrief

.

A new sales pitch has been offered to Israel for the F-35. The change in the tenor of the F-35 program management pitch is much more desperate. It is very time sensitive. “Buy now while the offer lasts”. What’s more is that it will be a specific Israeli variant.

Now that the program is one big flying question mark and the U.S. DOD has to figure out how to save not only the DOD F-35 project office but Lockheed Martin et al, we hear a different tune.

Before, the U.S. was hard-nosed about the F-35 and Israel in that it would only get U.S. systems. That has changed. Now that the traditional JSF team partners aren’t picking up early buys of the aircraft because, well, there is really nothing close to a go-to-war aircraft ready to consider with a known price, the F-35 program has to chase after other money.

By trying to lock up a deal with Israel for the F-35, a feast can be made off of the $3 billion per year the U.S. taxpayer forks over to Israel. Money laundering at its finest; and it is all legal. The F-35 program needs this money.

The new pitch to Israeli for the F-35 will now incorporate the Spice precision guidance weapon and the Python 5 air-to-air missile. More, it will include interfaces for Israeli specific command and control networking and other associate systems. Electronic warfare is a different story. Not mentioned much is logistics and sustainment. It will be interesting to see the language Israeli negotiators use for settling this.

Like others, Israel will want to see real progress on demonstrating a go-to-war F-35. That will be a very long wait.

.

Here is what the USAF expected to get their F-35s for in a previous budget. The USAF budget is the baseline for any discussion on F-35 price–such as it is with all of the turmoil.

F-35A_P-40_AFD-080204-081_$97.41 Avg UPC_1763 Units-3_2008UPC

.

My latest for F-16.net. Blind Faith.

It is reported in today’s The Australian that defence chiefs support the purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ( JSF ). In other news, the sun set in the west, and Britney Spears lip syncs parts of her live performance.

.

Given the risks of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, the U.S. Defense Department, political leaders (and other potential customers), need to look into the mirror and see if their air power roadmap exhibits any of these symptoms.

The Kanjorski amendment would empower federal regulators to rein in and dismantle financial firms that are so large, inter-connected, or risky that their collapse would put at risk the entire American economic system, even if those firms currently appear to be well-capitalized and healthy. Therefore, American taxpayers should no longer be on the hook for bailouts, as financial companies would not be able to become “too big to fail.” The Kanjorski amendment outlines clear and objective standards for regulators to examine financial companies and reduce the level of risk their activities pose to our financial stability and our economy.

.

When you have nothing left but blue-sky marketing and Ponzi schemes… you make due with just that. The following quote is from today’s SMH article. It is the height of absurdity in trying to sell something. “Don’t consider that we do not have anywhere near a go-to-war system to show the buyer…. continue on with sharks-with-lasers and so on”, seems to be the message.

The Lightning II may eventually be fitted with lasers able to shoot down attacking missiles. The head of Lockheed Martin’s Lightning program and former test pilot, Tom Burbage, said in Canberra the company was looking at special applications including an anti-missile laser system.

”They are lethal countermeasures in that with a laser you could actually destroy something that’s coming at the aircraft,” Mr Burbage said.

Yeah well, how about just stick to the original script Tom and get some progress on the jet itself. Lets see how gullible Australia’s national security of cabinet can be.

.

The quote below is a recent Australian Defence response mentioned in The Australian in reference to the delays and other program problems associated with the troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

A Defence spokesman said that despite the challenges facing the F-35 project, it was making progress and that the US was committed to making it a success.

"Overall the JSF program continues to make good progress but as a developmental program many challenges remain," the spokesman said. "The Australian government has taken account of information to date to ensure we have sufficiently mitigated risks arising from these challenges."

Even when reporting this the news media source in question doesn’t do any real reporting on the issue. For example, there is plenty of evidence available to show that Defence has never had a handle on how to upgrade the RAAF’s fighter force.

F-35 JSF: The Gamekeeper vs the Poachers

F-35 JSF: Becoming Your Own Peer Threat

F-35 JSF Program: Assessment of Top Level Programmatic Risks

Mr Secretary – Why Does the Pentagon Say the JSF is a 5th Generation Fighter . . Really?

JSF Alternate Realities: …and from whence they come

Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defence Penetration Capabilities

Analysing the ADF Air Combat Capability "On the Record"

.

The Japan Times has an interesting article about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, (JSF). It states that Japan might be closer to placing the F-35 into their defense plans.

They are trying for a 2011 target date for input into the budget but may postpone the decision until 2012 due to a view in the government that a contract shouldn’t be concluded until the aircrafts actual capabilities can be confirmed. This makes one wonder what their “plan-B” is if the troubled F-35 program doesn’t pan out.

If Japan does participate, it would have to be as they have done with previous fighter aircraft efforts. That is, mostly license built at home.

While the JSF partnership of the U.S., Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey (Israel and Singapore being low level contributors) has it’s own “best value” vendor awards for who produces certain components, true U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deals are different.

If needed, the FMS contract can be written so that the customer does home industry build for any number of components that are in their skill-sets. For example; Korea has a large aerospace industry; enough to build quantities of F-16 components. Any F-35 FMS sale to them could involve Korea building a variety of F-35 components that are already built by the original JSF partnership.

If Japan selects the F-35, they will be gunning for the largest amount of home industry build of the aircraft that they can get away with. Like Korea, since they are not locked into the team JSF memorandum of agreement, they, as a customer, can do some real hard negations of what defines a Japanese F-35. If the FMS proposal is not to their liking, the seller can go fish. This also implies huge support contracts which are a money spinner for the original JSF partner nations.

Some JSF documents over the years state that any FMS sale of the F-35 produces a fee paid back to the original Team JSF partners. That will be interesting to see how that will be performed in a tough-as-nails FMS negotiation with the Japanese, or for that matter, any other potential F-35 FMS customer.

Any plan for Japan to acquire the F-35 will likely be incorporated into defence policy guidelines and a “medium-term” defense buildup plan to be adopted by December 2010.

Japan is looking for an initial buy of 40 F-35s which are estimated to cost 9 billion yen each (about $101 million U.S).

.

More e-mails between Hasan, cleric may exist

U.K. Iraq report: Secret papers reveal blunders and concealment

F-35 JSF: The Gamekeeper vs the Poachers

In Response to Rocket Fire, IAF Struck Terrorist Sites in Gaza

General reflects on changes at Air Mobility

.